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The Question That Killed
Critical Legal Studies
Richard Michael Fischl
A Guide to Critical Legal Studies. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp. 360. $30.00.

MARK KELMAN,

A short while ago, I attended the 25th reunion of my eighth-grade
graduation class. I had been looking forward to getting together with the
70 or so folks with whom I had experienced parochial school during the
late 1950s and early 1960s for a host of reasons-not the least of which
was that I expected to see my "first love," to whom I had not spoken in
well over 20 years. I had long since blown that candle out, but I was intrigued by reports from mutual friends and acquaintances suggesting that
she and I had followed remarkably parallel life paths. She, too, had gone
to law school; she, too, had gone on to teaching after a stint in practice;
she, too, had come to love the classroom and to enjoy scholarly life; and
she, too, had evidently succumbed to the entreaties of her colleagues to
undertake a multitude of thankless institutional-service tasks-the last a
pattern of behavior that perhaps only unexpurgated Catholic guilt could
explain. So I was dying to know: Did she still go to church? The Church?
To confession? Did she take communion during the Eastertide? Eat meat
on Fridays?
When the moment of truth at last arrived, she had a different agenda.
"So," she said after a warm hello, "I hear you're a crit." My mind raced
for a response. I couldn't deny it-not, in any event, in this setting, where
Richard Michael Fischl is professor of law, University of Miami. The author extends
his heartfelt thanks to Tony Alfieri, Terry Anderson, Jim Atleson, David Caploe, Marc
Fajer, Duncan Kennedy, Jeremy Paul, Pierre Schlag, Steve Schnably, and Steve Winter for
their thoughtful criticisms of an earlier draft.
1. All quotes are to the best of my recollection. Given the splendid reveries conjured
up by the occasion-not to mention the beer I was drinking-I make no claims to complete
accuracy.
© 1993 American Bar Foundation.
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there was a serious possibility that even a single evasive maneuver might
prompt a nearby cock to crow at dawn's first light. Besides, I suspected
that she had a highly credible source: a classmate with whom we'd both
kept in touch over the years, who is a disciple of the late Allan Bloom and
has had a bit of a closed mind himself with respect to my longstanding
association with critical legal studies. I opted instead for confession and
avoidance, intended primarily to get us off the subject fast. "Relax," I
replied, "We're no threat to anyone anymore. Greetings from the dustbin
of history."
"It was bound to fail, Michael," she continued, in the patient and
sympathetic tone that has no doubt helped make her the great teacher
that by all accounts she has become. "The problem with critical legal studies is that it didn't offer any alternative program. Now I'm no great defender of the rule of law, but what would you put in its place?"
"If cls is dead," I replied, "that's the question that did us in." I didn't
try to explain, and she didn't seem to mind. (Someone ought to write
something about the ways in which the supposedly distinct rhetorical
structures of cocktail banter and the Socratic method in some missing mirror meet). Mercifully, the conversation moved on to other and far more
agreeable topics, and all of us to a truly remarkable weekend of rich reminiscence and powerful reconnection.2 But my classmate's question and the
kernel of truth contained in my glib response have stuck with me since.
This essay, then, is about that question-What would you put in its place?and the role that it has played in the reaction of many mainstream legal
academics to the critical legal studies movement.

Truth be told, a number of close friends from within cls tried to convince me to select a different title for this piece, fearing that irony might be
mistaken for eulogy-particularly among those who, for one reason or another, might not mourn for a moment the movement's passing. So let the
record show that the rumors of our demise are greatly exaggerated: Hav3
ing in many ways set the intellectual agenda for legal theory in the 1980s,
2. For the record, her answers to my questions were: (church) no; (Church) no; (confession) no; (communion) no; (meat on Friday) no, nor on any other day. Careers were thus
not all that we had in common.
3. See, e.g., "Constitutional Law from a Critical Legal Perspective: A Symposium," 36
Buff. L Rev. 211 (1987); Symposium, "Roberto Unger's Politics: A Work in Constructive
Social Theory," 81 Nw. U.L Rev. 589 (1987); "Professing Law: A Colloquy on Critical
Legal Studies," 31 St. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1986); "Symposium on Critical Legal Studies," 6 Cardozo L Rev. 691 (1985); Symposium: "A Critique of Rights," 62 Tex. L Rev. 1363 (1984);

"Critical Legal Studies Symposium," 36 Stan. L Rev. 1 (1984); Symposium, "The Public/
Private Distinction," 130 U. Pa. L Rev. 1289 (1982); Symposium, "Legal Scholarship: Its
Nature and Purposes," 90 Yale L.J. 955 (1981); see also Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare,

"A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies," 94 Yale LJ. 461 (1985) (listing over 500 clsproduced or influenced books and articles published through the early 1980s).
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cIs scholars and those working in kindred critical/progressive traditions
are alive and well, rethinking old issues, 4 exploring new ones, 5 and doing
what is for my money the most interesting and important work in legal
6
scholarship today.
But if the title is thus somewhat hyperbolic, it nevertheless captures
something very real about the relationship between critical legal studies
and the rest of the profession. By my estimate, the average non-cls academic will converse politely with a crit for about three minutes before asking-pointedly-some version of my eighth-grade classmate's question.
Published reactions to and assessments of our work are scarcely more patient. Listen, for example, to the chorus of reviewers of Mark Kelman's A
Guide to Critical Legal Studies as they endlessly repeat the same refrain:
Time after time, a reader wants to cry out: "Doubtless, it is all a mess.
But what, exactly, do you propose to put in place of the legal system
7
you are attacking?"
Like much other CLS literature, Kelman's book is long on withering
critiques of adversaries and short on positive prescriptions of alternate solutions. 8
The critics Kelman summarizes have themselves been criticized for
their negative approach. They have been challenged to come up with
a theory to replace the theories that they have been so busy
dismantling. 9
Having seen through rationalism, but forsaken Western tradition,
where can [cls scholars] turn for the content of their radical utopia?
S..Kelman is not alone among Crits in his inability to articulate a
concrete radical alternative. 10
The crits have seemed unwilling to explain what kind of society they
want, or -whatkind of social change they would like to see.... The[y]
have never tried seriously to propose concrete social changes; indeed,
4. See, e.g., the recent considerable refinement of earlier cls analyses of the recurring
rhetorical structures of legal argument in Duncan Kennedy, "A Semiotics of Legal Argument," 42 Syracuse L Rev. 75 (1991); Jeremy Paul, "The Politics of Legal Semiotics," 69 Tex.
L Rev. 1779 (1991); J.M. Balkin, "The Promise of Legal Semiotics," 69 Tex. L Rev. 1831
(1991).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, "Beyond Critique: Law, Culture, and the Politics of Form,"
69 Tex. L Rev. 1595 (1991); "Postmodernism and Law: A Symposium," 62 U. Colo. L Rev.
439 (1991); Symposium: "The Frontiers of Legal Thought" (pts. 1-3), 1990 Duke Lj. 193,
375, 625.
6. See generally David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (rev. ed.
New York: Pantheon, 1990) ("Kairys, Politics of Law").
7. Eugene D. Genovese, "Critical Legal Studies as Radical Politics and World View," 3
Yale J.L & Hum. 131, 133 (1991) (book review).
8. Theodore J.St. Antoine, Book Review, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 142, 142 (1989).
9. Robert E. Rodes, Jr., "Critical Legal Studies," 39 J.Legal Educ. 141, 141 (1989)
(book review).
10. William B. Lindsey, "Well-plowed Fields," Nat'l Rev., 29 April 1988, at 47, 48.
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it is hard to imagine what they could propose that would not be essentially reformist."
Kelman's first failure, then, is his inability to make a positive case for
CLS by showing that CLS itself posits something other than destruction of the current legal order.... Why read a tedious summary of a
movement's views when the movement will ultimately be judged as
trendy and insubstantial for its lack of an alternative? Until CLS has
a "coherent" legal model of its own, it does no
one any lasting good
2
to attack the current model as "incoherent."'
[Kelman] finally asserts the central CLS story: We think in reified
systems that make the social world seem necessary, natural[,J and
just.... But Kelman... never
gives an account of his payoff: how
3
we could remake the world.'
Mr. Kelman believes that if he can demolish (or as he likes to say,
"trash") the intellectual foundations of Western liberalism as they are
revealed in the writings of mainstream jurists, something better will
rise from the ashes, but he makes no effort to justify that faith, instead ending the book with this wistful sentence: "[Critical
scholars]
4
try to retrace, hoping to see where we first got lost."'
For there to be significance in these criticisms [of liberalism] it is essential that Kelman establish both that there is some escape from the
incoherence he sees and that there is a moral or practical failure of
the liberal world he describes.... Even if CLS criticisms are meaningful, there is no alternative vision described in anything other than
the most general and abstract of terms. 5
Nor is this phenomenon confined to a narrow span of the political spec-

trum; as these quotations suggest, What would you put in its place?-or some
closely related variant of that question-is with striking regularity posed
by individuals associated with the academy's ideological left, right, and
center alike.
My argument here is that this question-not the supposed failure of
cls to answer it, but the assumptions and structures of thought that are

embedded in and revealed by the question itself-has been a principal cause
of a systematic misreading and mischaracterization of cls work by mainstream legal scholars. This essay is thus a continuation of the project begun by Pierre Schlag, Richard Delgado, and my colleague Steve Winter in
11. Daniel Farber, "Down by Law," New Republic, 4 Jan. 1988, at 36, 39.
12. Richard L. Barnes, "Searching for Answers without the Questions," 34 S.D.L. Rev.

220, 221, 222 (1989) (book review).
13. John Stick, "Charting the Development of Critical Legal Studies," 88 Colum. L

Rev. 407, 432 (1988) (book review).
14. Richard A. Posner, "A Manifesto for Legal Renegades," Wall St J., 27 Jan. 1988, at
23.
15. Calvin R. Massey, "Law's Inferno," 39 Hastings Li. 1269, 1271 (1988) (book
review).
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their recent symposium, "The Critique of Normativity."

16

Schlag and his

confreres posit something of a Heisenberg uncertainty principle operating
in the rhetorical structures of American legal thought: The obsessive focus on normative questions-Where should we go? What should we do?
What would you put in its place?-makes it all but impossible for legal scholars to comprehend the current predicament of law and legal theory, to see
where we already are and to recognize what we already do.17 My aim here is
to examine further the role that normativity plays in producing legal
thought's considerable capacity for resisting self-reflection and analysis.
To paraphrase a sage dictum, those who view the world through the lens
of the normative question have a tendency to see normativity even when it
isn't there. They have thus frequently misunderstood the work of scholars
who are, or at least who endeavor to be, relentlessly critical-who are doing work that is designed to cultivate the very self-consciousness that mainstream legal thought so mightily resists. Indeed, the argument here is that
this obsession with normativity has distorted the mainstream understanding of critical scholarship in a particular and systematic way, leading many
readers to conclude that the refusal of cls scholars to engage the What
would you put in its place? question is at best an irresponsible act of naive
utopianism, and at worst a strategic move designed to hide a covert commitment to some sort of Stalinist totalitarianism.
16. 139 U.Pa. L Rev. 801 (1991).
17. See Pierre Schlag, "Normativity and the Politics of Form," 139 U. Pa. L Rev. 801,
804-5 (1991) (footnote omitted):
What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the
hard questions. These are the momentous questions.
And they are the wrong ones.
They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal
thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic
thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly
"realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative
questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their
work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which
human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to
address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally
competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work
incentives, and productivity monitoring-they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic
power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves
as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their
own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts.
It isn't so.
Schlag laid the groundwork for this provocative thesis in " 'Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi':
The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction," 11 Cardozo L Rev. 1631
(1990), and "Normative and Nowhere to Go," 43 Stan. L Rev. 167 (1990); he further elaborated it in "The Problem of the Subject," 69 Tex. L Rev. 1627 (1991).

784 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

In order to provide a convincing account of what I see as the underlying conceptual phenomenon, it seems sensible to begin the essay with an
extended example of the sort of misreading of cls to which I am referring.
To that end, I have chosen the review of Kelman's Guide written by Professor Calvin Massey (hereafter MR),'8 one of the voices in the What would
you put in its place? chorus we heard from a moment ago. A word or two
about the adequacy of representation provided by the texts in question is
thus in order. First, I make no claim that Massey is a "typical" legal academic, whatever that means; though he is evidently a productive and talented scholar, 19 the review under examination suggests an attraction to
"natural law" theory that is still relatively unusual in the legal academy
(MR at 1292-94). Nor, for that matter, do I mean to suggest that Kelman's
Guide is in any sense the "quintessential" cls work. For one thing, it was
published in 1987, toward the end of what may well have been the halcyon
days of cls; 2 0 it is therefore to some extent already outdated. Indeed, at

least in part for that reason, the Guide gives the shortest shrift to several
strands of cls scholarship-including critical race theory and deconstruction-that seem to me to be central to the cls contribution to legal
thought. Moreover, some of the difficulties that Massey and other reviewers have evidently encountered in understanding the book may be at least
in part attributable to its particular author rather than common to cls
work generally-a point to which I will return shortly. Nevertheless, the
Guide remains the single most ambitious and comprehensive attempt to
21
date to describe the contours of cls as an intellectual movement; similarly, Massey's review is by far the most sustained critical analysis of the
Guide written by anyone outside of cls. Taken together, they offer an opportunity to observe in some detail-quote by quote and citation by citation-the anatomy of a misreading of cls work.
Part I of the essay, then, is a close look at Kelman's presentation of
several classic cls arguments and the sometimes striking, sometimes subtle
misunderstandings of those arguments offered by Massey. In part II, I attempt to demonstrate that Massey's misreading is in large part a product
of a pattern of unexamined assumptions that are central to normative legal
thought. In part III, I will attempt to demonstrate that this phenomenon
18. 39 Hastings LJ. 1269.
19. An Infocheck run reveals that Massey published over a dozen law review articles
between 1986 and 1992, and that many of them appeared in such distinguished journals as
the University of Chicago Law Review, Wisconsin Law Review, Duke Law Journal, and his home
institution's Hastings Law Journal.
20. And Halcion nights, if my own experience as a crit securing tenure at the time in
question is any indication.
21. Despite its title, Roberto Mangabeira Unger's The Critical Legal Studies Movement
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986) represents much more of an effort to
construct and massage the author's own provocative jurisprudential and social theories than
it does an attempt-like the one Kelman provides in the Guide-to synthesize and analyze
the work of the cls movement as a whole.
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is at work in the critiques of cls by a wide range of non-cls academics. To
that end, we shall consider the reviews of the Guide written by Richard
Barnes, a seemingly moderate conservative; Daniel Farber, a centrist-liberal pragmatist; and Eugene Genovese, an eminent Marxist historian. My
argument is that each of these writers has misunderstood-and accordingly mischaracterized-cls work in much the same way as Massey has and
that What would you put in its place? thinking is the common culprit.

L

MISSING THE MARK

A.

Kelman and the Privileged Positions

Much of the Guide is an exploration of what Kelman and others in cls
have called the contradictions of liberal legal thought-the "mirror-image
contradictory norms" (at 13) that frame our recurring debates with respect
to the appropriate form of legal commands (bright-line rules vs. situationsensitive standards) (ch. 1); the nature of values (subjectivism vs. objectivism) (ch. 2); the foundations of our behavior (intentionalism vs. determinism) (ch. 3); and, to some extent underlying the rest, the idealized forms of
human association (individualism vs. altruism) (at, e.g., 4-5, 54-63). The
result, according to Kelman, is "justificatory indeterminacy": the simultaneous commitment of the legal system to these competing norms, "each of
which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter how 'easy' the
case first appears)" (at 13). One of the great strengths of the Guide is that
Kelman extends the descriptive power of this analysis considerably by attempting to vindicate the intuition that liberalism systematically favors
one of the two poles in each of the contradictions-that rules, intentionalism, subjectivity of value, and individualism are "privileged positions" in
liberal legal thought, and that the countervailing commitments to standards, determinism, objectivism, and altruism are to a considerable degree
devalued and even repressed (at, e.g., 3-4, 290-95). Taken together, Kelman observes, these privileged positions "describe the program of a remarkably right-wing, quasilibertarian order" (at 4-5).
As the rest of this essay will attempt to demonstrate, Kelman's vigorous analysis and criticism of liberalism's "privileged positions" apparently
convinced many of his reviewers that cls supports a counterprogram of
unrelenting legal informality and communitarianism, firmly founded on a
determinist view of human nature and a belief in the existence of objective
values. I think that this is a misconstruction of Kelman, and it certainly is
of most of cls; exposing and indicting the "privileged positions" is not the
same thing as holding the starry-eyed view that an amalgam of their oppo-
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sites would constitute some sort of cls-inspired Utopia. 22 Indeed, to take
just one example, if liberalism's available image of autonomy as an ideal
projects a world that only a robot could love,23 its vision of community is
frequently naive and sentimental; 24 and the relevance of either image to
current experience is awfully difficult to discern.25 Accordingly, we reserve
our harshest criticisms for individualism, rules, etc., because they are privileged, not because we think that their devalued companions form a prefera26
ble alternative in anything like their present form.
Yet it is only fair to note that there is a textual basis for a different
reading of the Guide. For one thing, Kelman abruptly dismisses the insights of deconstruction and linguistic theory (at 12-14 &-n.27), a move
that ultimately leaves him without a convincing account of the privileging
22. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics 7 (New York: Free
Press, 1975) ("one can begin to imagine the rudiments of a better alternative to the liberal
doctrine, but this alternative should not be mistaken for the liberal view set upside down").
23. And a male robot at that. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, "Liberal Jurisprudence and
Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice," 16
N.M.L Rev. 613 (1986); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
162-63 & n.30 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989).
24. See, e.g., Robin West, "Jurisprudence and Gender," 55 U. Chi. L Rev. 1, 28-36
(1988).
25. See Schlag, 139 U. Pa. L Rev. at 907:
What the liberals fail to notice is that while they are talking about the individual versus
community, the reproduction and extension of bureaucratic practices routinely traverses back and forth across the public/private distinction without giving that venerable liberal distinction a moment's thought-thereby extinguishing ab initio the liberal
version of both individualism and community. It turns out that being a liberal means
that you worry a great deal about getting just the right combination of individual freedom and community, while getting neither.
26. For this reason, it has always seemed to me that in the debate over the critique of
rights the critical race theorists were the "true" crits, providing thick and nuanced descriptions of profound conflict in the social experience of law and challenging the comparatively
arid analyses of both liberal rights and left "anti-rights" thinkers. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, "The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?" 22
Ha. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 301, 314-18, 321 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations," 22 Hary. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 323, 332-42 (1987);
Patricia J.Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,"
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 401, 404-6 (1987). Indeed, I had thought that this was pretty
much the point of that marvelous passage from E. P. Thompson's Wihigs and Hunters: The
Origins of the Black Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) cited so frequently in the first
generation of cls work:
IT]he rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defense of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified
human good. To deny or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the
resources and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desperate error of intellectual
abstraction. More than this, it is a self-fulfilling error, which encourages us to give up
the struggle against bad laws and class-bound procedures, and to disarm ourselves
before power. It is to throw away a whole inheritance of struggle about law, and within
the forms of law, whose continuity can never be fractured without bringing men and
women into immediate danger.
Id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
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phenomenon he otherwise so perceptively unearths and criticizes. The
reader might thus form the impression that privileging is simply a result of
bias, design, or intellectual infirmity on the part of argument choosersfolks picking the wrong poles, as it were-rather than a product of widely
shared but unexamined structures of thought revealed and reinforced by
the linguistic practices that Kelman's account all but ignores.27
Indeed, that impression is reinforced by some of Kelman's attempts at
irony: "Rules," he declares at the end of the first chapter, "are the opiate
of the masses" (at 63). Standards, he might just as well have added, are the
apologetic mush of the liberal intelligentsia-as any crit who has taught
her way through the Second Restatement of Contracts (to take just one
example) would be quick to point out. 28 Instead, Kelman waxes romantic
about the connection between standards and a commitment to the possibility of moral consensus and discourse, offering short shrift to what are by
now the conventional counterarguments that in any other circumstance
cls would be the first to deploy (at 59-63). A fair reading of the Guide as a
whole-and of critical scholarship more generally-makes it clear that cls
is far more anti-"rule" than it is pro-"standard." But it is no wonder that
some readers-Professor Massey among them-might be prompted by
Kelman's radical-chic sloganeering to conclude that Kelman and other cls
scholars would prefer "an exclusiviely standard-based legal system" (MR at
1275) and thus condemn bright-line rules as "politically incorrect" (id. at
1274).
The Guide may invite this sort of misreading in a second way. Early
in the book, Kelman articulates the keen insight (at 4-5, emphasis in original) that:
liberalism is culturally and intellectually self-confident only in its
right-wing libertarian form, because libertarianism is in one sense sim27. To be sure, Kelman seems to be aware of a linguistic dimension to the privileging
phenomenon, observing at one point that "[riule -exception relations [such as contract law's
treatment of paternalist interventions as begrudging exceptions to a general rule of private
ordering] are communicated by subtle linguistic hints" (at 292). Yet the way Kelman frames
this point suggests that he thinks that privileging exists apart from and prior to the linguistic
structures it is then "communicated" through. Indeed, he reveals a similar assumption in
his account of legal indeterminacy, a phenomenon he attributes to conflicts within liberalism's underlying conceptual or "justificatory" premises rather than to the recurring analytical structures of legal texts (at 12-13). For analyses that by contrast treat thought and
language as interpenetrating, see, e.g., Schlag, II Cardozo L Rev. 1631 (cited in note 17);
Steven L. Winter, "Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive

Stakes for Law," 137 U.Pa. L Rev. 1105 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Schlag, 139 U. Pa. L Rev. at 931 n.32 (cited in note 17):
Sometime in the future, the ALI will publish the Third Restatement on Everything. It
will be a comprehensive compilation of four-part balancing tests all based on key terms
that will themselves be defined in terms of four-part balancing tests, and so on in such a
way that the Third Restatement on Everything will have achieved the first totally comprehensive, totally closed system of totally self-referential four-part balancing tests. It
will be great. Then it will turn to mud.
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ply the summary of the privileged positions in liberal thought. My
strong belief is that people who call themselves liberals can most comfortably explain their attachment to a society based on the privileged
poles ...

,

but that they are remarkably inarticulate and uncomforta-

ble explaining their often powerful nonlibertarian impulses.
This is Kelman at his cls best: the astute observer of the subtle relationship between style and substance in legal argument, identifying a particular
intellectual phenomenon reproduced broadly across our legal culture. 29
But from that provocative observation he appears to conclude not just
that liberalism is most self-confident in its right-wing libertarian form but
that this is what liberalism really is. Law and economics, he argues, "is the
best worked-out, most consummated liberal legal ideology of the sort that
CLS has tried both to understand and to critique" (at 114); and, true to
his word, Kelman spends much of the rest of the book claiming to challenge liberal legalism but doing battle instead with the right-wing legal
economists (at, e.g., 114-85).
We've seen this move before: Rather than challenging the positions
that you've actually taken, the critic outlines something he insists is the
"best worked-out, most consummated" version of your theory-never
mind that you've spent a very great deal of scholarly time and effort challenging that supposedly "best worked-out, most consummated" version
yourself. Those of us associated with cls think it grossly unjust when our
critics make an analytically identical move and argue that Stalinist totalitarianism is the "best worked-out, most consummated" version of our position-in the face of the fact that a common intellectual thread that ties
together virtually all cls work is its rejection of the authoritarianism and
vulgar determinism suggested by the Stalinist label. To be sure, in the
context of our culture a charge of closet libertarianism carries with it none
of the insidious political baggage that accompanies a charge of Stalinism.
But by deploying the argumentative strategy of judging the merits of an
idea by the way it would look if taken to its supposed logical extreme-and
in effect accusing others of taking positions that they in fact conscientiously reject 3 0 -Kelman invites his readers to do the same with his own
29. Of perhaps even greater significance is his related observation that critical scholars
"find themselves in roughly the same relationship to their actual political beliefs as left liberals are to theirs. That is, they have... learned to argue confidently for a position one step
to the right of their actual position" (at 5, emphasis in original). I think that Kelman is right
in this, but I do wish that he had elaborated the point, for it may well be the most interesting and powerful example of just how "privileged" the so-called privileged positions are:
Even those of us who are more or less conscious and in any event critical of the privileging
are nonetheless caught in the gravitational pull. Here too Kelman's account might have
been enriched by the insights of deconstruction and language theory that he so summarily
dismisses.
30. See, e.g., the thoughtful critique of law and economics in Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire 276-312 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1986).
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arguments. As will shortly be evident, that invitation produces many en3
thusiastic takers. '
B.

Massey's Review

Having said all that, the misreadings of the Guide are not in my view
all nor even mostly Kelman's fault. I turn, then, to two extended illustrations of my point drawn from Massey's review: the first, his claims regarding the cls "position" on choice, determinism, and paternalism; the
second, his claims regarding cls views on the relationship between law and
society.
1.

32

Choice, Determinism, and Paternalism

According to Massey, "[t]he CLS vision is of a world where choice is
illusory, where we are all determined by extrinsic factors" (MR at 1294)
and where "the nominal 'self' that appears to choose"-in the course of
private contracting, for example-"is utterly determined by its social
framework" (id. at 1281). Accordingly, says Massey quoting the Guide,
Kelman and cls think that "the answer is simply '[clollectively imposed
uniformity... [which] may well be needed to rationalize a choice that few
can make unless it seems utterly out of their hands, even though they
would in some sense like to make it'" (id. at 1280). "Naturally," Massey
continues, "it is the CLS vision of the appropriate choice that must be
collectively imposed, for Kelman senses that there might be some resistance to the choices mandated for Montana cowboys by a mandarin class of
elite academic radicals" (id.). This " 'paternalistic' substitution of new
choices," argues Massey, is in the view of cls "really just a way of making
31. I doubt very much that any of this was intentional on Kelman's part. Rather, I
suspect that he was just playing to his strengths, for what Kelman does best-and better
than just about anyone else-is to challenge the legal economists on their own turf. Indeed,
Kelman's basic insight-that liberal culture is most secure in defending the libertarian version of its world view-exposes a stark vulnerability of liberal thought: Undermine legal
economics, and you may well have taken its queen. For one thing, the claims of the legal
economists seem in a remarkable number of ways to vindicate what passes for "common

sense" among the educated laity; establishing that those claims already assume many of the
very "commonsense" propositions that they purport to prove is accordingly a sound strategy in the battle for the hearts and minds of our students and of the legal profession generally. Moreover, in much the same way that the Realist critique dramatically changed the
parameters of academic debate-less perhaps because "we are all Realists now" than because
virtually no one who admits to being a formalist will be taken seriously-the work of Kelman, Duncan Kennedy, Pierre Schlag, and others has succeeded in demonstrating that
Coase cuts both ways and that price theory is to social life pretty much as Velveeta is to
cheese.
32. Unless otherwise indicated, all ellipses, bracketed material, and emphases appear
here just as they did in Massey's review.
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an individual's preferences conform to his 'true' self" (id. at 1281). Indeed, Massey asserts, Kelman ultimately "dismisses" doubts about the legitimacy of even those paternalist interventions that cannot be justified on
" 'true' self" grounds and "insists that 'it is ultimately neither possible nor
desirable for [cls] to disclaim the legitimacy of paternalist motives" (id. at
1280-81). Massey reports that Kelman attempts to "justify" such paternalism on the ground that it is "a pervasive activity" in which "even liberals
engage"; but "[gliven the fear and loathing with which the Crits approach
liberal thought and practice," Massey reasons, "this is a surprising justification" (id. at 1281).
In point of fact, Kelman's arguments about the insights of cls scholarship regarding choice, determinism, and paternalism bear not the slightest
resemblance to Massey's characterizations. In the passages to which Massey refers, Kelman's focus is on liberalism's simultaneous commitment to
conflicting images of the individual-one in which desires are the unmediated product of free will versus one in which they are determined by
the various forces of social life-not on the supposed exclusive belief of cls
scholars in one image or the other (at 126-41; see also 86-113). Kelman is
not, as Massey would have it, arguing that "choice is illusory" (MR at
1294) and promoting a regime of cls-imposed "paternalism" in its place (id.
at 1280-81). Rather, Kelman is challenging the rigid intentionalist view of
those who contend that individual preferences-even self-endangering
ones-are "contingent only on factors far beyond our conscious collective
control" (at 135). Kelman points to a host of examples drawn from legal
life that strongly suggest that the converse is the case (or at least that we
often act as if we believe that it were)--citing, for example, mandatory
"waiting periods" for certain kinds of purchases, the rules regulating the
right to refuse extraordinary medical care, and abortion statutes requiring
parental notification (at 133-34 & nn.60-63). Obviously, the deployment
of each of these devices assumes that individual preferences can change
and, more to the point, that the context in which choice takes place may
in some significant sense "determine" the outcome.
Kelman, then, is simply recounting the important cls insight that liberal legalism is already rife with paternalism, but that it often represses this
fact by reconstructing the individual in a determinist image and asserting
that legal decision makers are merely vindicating the (reconstructed) individual's "true" or "considered" preferences rather than overruling them
(at 137, emphasis in original):
Given the availability of a determinist picture of the self, it is not
surprising that there is no clear line between paternalistic interventions that avowedly disrespect a chooser's will and appeals to the
individual's own preference structure. If some hypothetical self significantly distinct from the concrete person we encounter, "created" by
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a different social framework, is always imaginable, we can always claim
to appeal not to "true" judgments of the good but to this hypothetical self's judgments of the good.
This is a classic cls move: trumping the privileged position (here, intentionalism) on its own turf by reaching into the lawyer's bag of tricks for a
stock argument provided by the corresponding liberal counterimage (here,
determinism).33 But pointing to the "availability" within liberalism of "a
determinist picture of the self" that lawyers, judges, and academics can
and regularly do use to justify paternalistic state interventions is something
rather different from making the argument that Massey wrongly attributes
to Kelman-that cls scholars actually believe that such intetventions are
''really just a way of making an individual's preferences conform to his
'true' self" (MR at 1281).
Let us carefully consider Massey's related claim that Kelman and
other cls scholars-who have identified the various difficulties we encounter in attempting to distinguish in any meaningful way the individual's
"true" or "considered" preferences from ambivalence, whim, or the exogenous effects of decisional context (at 127-37)--think that "the answer is
simply '[c]ollectively imposed uniformity... [which] may well be needed to
rationalize a choice that few can make unless it seems utterly out of their
hands, even though they would in some sense like to make it" (MR at
1280). Cast in that form, the position sounds a lot like a plea for a cen-

trally planned, state-controlled economy with cls operating as the Central
Committee; the reader would be unlikely to guess that in the passage to
which Massey refers Kelman is talking about seat-belt laws and workplace
safety legislation (at 135-36). Far from broadly embracing "[clollectively
imposed uniformity" (MR at 1280), Kelman is once again analyzing the
instances of that activity that already occur-once again demonstrating the
availability of determinist imagery, and hence the legitimacy of certain pa-

ternalist interventions, within liberal legalism. And far from enthusiastically embracing that imagery as his own-let alone, as Massey claims,
contending that cls should "impos[e]" its "vision" on "Montana cowboys" (id.)-Kelman expresses strong reservations about any claim that
our interventions will actually influence individual preferences in the intended manner. 34 Indeed, he issues a thoughtful warning to traditional
33. Notice, however, that the privileged position is challenged on its own rhetorical
turf: Determinism is deployed in the service of a kinder, gentler free will. That's why we call

it privileged.
34. One cannot help but notice that some of the more outspoken critics of cls reveal
an endearing if somewhat boyish fascination with "cowboys" that is quite nearly as intense
(and boyish) as their fixation with the cars crits supposedly drive. Compare MR at 1281
(cowboys) and James D. Gordon I, "Law Review and the Modem Mind," 33 Ariz. L Rev.
265, 269 (1991) (cars), with Brian Timmons, "That's No Okie, That's My Torts Professor,"
Wall St j., 3 Apr. 1990, at S A, p. 20 (cowboys and cars).
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leftists who might be seduced by the temptations of knee-jerk statism (at
136-37, emphases in original):
Whether these collective efforts have in fact solidified or rendered less
ambivalent many people's commitment to the aspects of character
they may well have sought to strengthen is certainly as problematic
and hopelessly contestable a contention as the claim that prohibitions
on the manifestation of unwanted character traits (like racism or excessive risk taking) ultimately affect the character trait itself.... Clearly,
those of us committed to radical politics must be particularly sensitive
to the possibility that our suppositions about how we will respond to
our efforts to transform the world that frames us are wrong, that our
dreams simply won't take. It seems to me that it is vital to be sensitive
to the resistance we may see to our efforts to change tastes.
To the extent that Kelman's analysis here is programmatic at all, then, he
is contending rather plausibly that our efforts would be better focused on
developing greater "sensitiv[ity]" to the resistance of those whose tastes we
might attempt to change with any paternalist intervention, rather than on
continuing the endless quest for trump cards in the essentially ideological
debate over our "capacity to make correct ex ante decisions about human
malleability" (at 137). But his principal point is that the liberal legalists
embrace determinism and paternalism in spite of their rhetorical commitment to intentionalism and that they do so far more often than mainstream analyses have generally supposed (at 127-37).
In the discussion thus far, we have been focusing on Massey's characterizations of Kelman's claims regarding what might be called "soft paternalism"-that is, collective interventions that are justified as efforts to
vindicate the "true" or "considered" preferences of individuals. I turn
now to the question of "hard paternalism": the forthright overruling
of individual choices, however "true" or "considered" they might be
thought to be. Once again, Massey completely misunderstands Kelman's
arguments.
Thus, far from "dismissing" doubts about the propriety of hard paternalism-as Massey would have it (MR at 1281)-Kelman expresses virtually nothing but doubts about it, doubts of his own and of cls scholars
more generally. Noting that most cls scholars seem to be considerably
more comfortable with the more modest claims of soft paternalism, Kelman first wonders whether this might be a "cowardly concession to the
power of the liberal choice-satisfying paradigm" and the traditional association of paternalism "with nonliberal beliefs in false and true conscious-
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ness, objective good, [and] vanguard classes" (at 138). 35 Alternatively, he
suggests (at 138), cls scholars may have
run away from traditional paternalist analysis not simply because of
its left-totalitarian Stalinist pedigree but also because of its right-elitist-racist-sexist pedigree (in which white male Anglo-Saxons forever
describe women and people of color as incapable of knowing their
own true interests, in need of the protection of the literal or figurative
father).
As for Kelman's own views on hard paternalism, Massey is simply
wrong when he says that Kelman "insists that 'it is ultimately neither possible nor desirable for [cls] to disclaim the legitimacy of paternalist motives' " (MR at 1281). In fact, Kelman is once again attempting to
demonstrate the extent to which paternalism-in even its hard version-is
already a pervasive if often un- or underacknowledged norm. (In contract
law, to take a field with which I am familiar, there is not just the obvious
case of the doctrine of incapacity cited by Massey (id.), but also among
many other examples those aspects of consideration doctrine that complicate the enforcement of unbargained-for promises in a multitude of social
as well as commercial settings.3 6) "[Qince one recognizes how unexceptional the activity we often try to exceptionalize and isolate really is," observes Kelman, it is "neither possible nor desirable for [cls] to disclaim the
legitimacy of paternalist motives entirely" (at 138, emphasis added to show
Massey's deletion). I need hardly point out that a claim that paternalist
motives ought not to be discounted "entirely" is rather different from the
suggestion contained in Massey's selectively edited version that paternalism should not be "disclaim[ed]" at all (MR at 1281, omitting without ellipses the word "entirely"). 37 Indeed, Kelman presents an extended
35. To be fair to Massey, Kelman's decision to put the point this way is another example of how his tone may obscure the substance of his arguments-although a careful reading
of the entire passage in question (at 138-41) suggests that this is another attempt at irony
and, in any event, makes clear that Kelman himself shares many of these apprehensions
about hard paternalism. From my own perspective, a far greater difficulty with Kelman's
argument here is that he missed yet another opportunity to explore the privileged positions
at work, this time by assuming that the rejection of paternalism by other cls scholars is the
result of a conscious choice-"cowardly" or otherwise-rather than of an unreflective response to the privileging of decisional autonomy in liberal thought; indeed, perhaps Kelman's assumption of a conscious choice is itself simply another example of the privileging of
intentionalism.
36. See, e.g., Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207 (Mass. 1825); see generally Duncan Kennedy,
"Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power," 41 Md. L Rev. 563, 631-38 (1982)
(collecting other examples from American contract law).
37. This is not the only place in Massey's review where his editing of Kelman's arguments may mislead. Consider Massey's claim (id. at 1284-85) that Kelman contradicts himself when he "castigates both CLS and mainstream scholars for assuming that norms have
'cross-culturally constant meaning' (p. 234) while he berates the constitutional framers as
'not an especially attractive group of people . . ., but rather ... overtly racist ... privileged
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analysis of the only sustained defense of hard paternalism in cls literature,
Duncan Kennedy's 1982 piece in Maryland Law Review. 38 And though he
is generally sympathetic with Kennedy's effort, Kelman is nevertheless
quite skeptical about the possibility of translating Kennedy's thoughtful
insights about our interventions in the lives of persons we know well and
care about deeply, to the more complex problem of "making decisions for
faceless others" that we are obliged to confront in most legal contexts (at

138-41).
Massey grudgingly acknowledges that "even Kelman has difficulty accepting [Kennedy's argument] as a justificatory norm" for hard paternalism, but takes Kelman to task for the latter's purported attempt to
"justify" the activity on the alternative ground of its "pervasive[ness]" in
the very "liberal thought and practice" that cls is supposed to "fear and
loath[e]" (MR at 1281). Massey misses the point, but he does so here in a
manner that goes a long way to suggest the underlying basis for each of the

misreadings we have thus far discussed: Massey is confusing normative
argument with critical analysis. Thus, the bulk of Kelman's discussion is
not an effort to "justify" paternalism by reference to some independent clsapproved normative criteria, any more than it is an attempt to defend a

"vision... of a world... where we are all determined by extrinsic factors"
(id. at 1294). Rather, it is an assault on the rhetorical hegemony of the

privileged positions of intentionalism and choice-an attempt "to make
the critical cases seem less exceptional" (at 133) by showing the ways in
which liberal legalism repeatedly embraces determinism and paternalism,
all the while denying that it is doing so.

2.

Law, Society, and Democracy

Massey makes precisely the same mistake-confusing programmatic
normativity with critique-when he attempts to characterize the views of
white males' " (p. 221). The ellipses are all Massey's, but it's worth noting exactly what he
left out. What Kelman actually said was that the framers were an "overtly racist, slaveholding
or slavery-toleratinggroup of privileged white males" (at 221, emphasis added to show Massey's
deletion). Remove the italicized material, and Kelman sounds like a "typical" radical making wild and unsubstantiated charges; leave it in, and the passage reminds us of certain
inconvenient but indisputable facts regarding our national heritage. See, e.g., U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 2 (requiring apportionment of representatives and taxes among the states to be
calculated by reference to "the whole Number of free Persons ...[and] three fifths of all
other Persons"). Moreover, the content of the first excision reveals that Kelman was not, as
Massey contends, judging the framers against "cross-cultura[l]" standards, but was instead
challenging the "jurisprudence of original intention" and therefore questioning the utility of
adherence to the framers' values in our own times. Thus, Kelman's claim-which is completely consistent with his skepticism concerning "cross-culturall]" standards-is simply that
the framers "are not an especially attractive group of people [and here is what Massey left
out] to use as models" for solving contemporary constitutional problems (at 221, emphasis
added).
38. 41 Md. L Rev. 563.
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Kelman and cls regarding the relationship between law and society. Thus,
Massey asserts that Kelman and other cls scholars believe that "law simply
masks as natural or legitimate an oppressive social order that serves the
interests of the ruling elite and that is culturally and historically determined" (MR at 1270 n.3; see also id. at 1287 n.39). Massey offers an example evidently designed to show that the "ruling elite," in the cls view, is
engaged in the business of "oppressi[on]" even when it appears not to be;
thus, according to Massey, "Kelman thinks the abortion liberalization
wrought by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 'may have been responsive
primarily to the demands . . . of men who wanted to strip women of a
major socially functional barrier (fear of pregnancy) to men's demands for
sexual access' " (MR at 1270 n.2). Pointing to the Guide's critique of the
Legal Process theories generally associated with Hart and Sacks (at ch. 6),
Massey accuses Kelman of viewing "the legislature" as "essentially a collection of racist, elitist, venal stooges of the dominant economic elite" (MR at
1283). Indeed, according to Massey, Kelman "dismisses democratic process (the electoral system is 'simply... a blinding deflection')" and "thinks
distinctions between courts and legislatures wholly irrelevant" (id. at
1281). "Presumably," Massey reasons-echoing his earlier claims about
the supposed cls desire to "mandate" personal and contractual choices for
"Montana cowboys" (id. at 1280)-in public life as well "the dictatorship
of an enlightened elite in a utopian post-liberal world is the answer served
up by CLS" (id. at 1281-82).
Once again, Massey's characterizations bear not the slightest resemblance to Kelman's arguments or to the claims of the cls scholarship generally. In the first place, far from contending that "law simply masks as
natural or legitimate an oppressive social order that serves the interests of
the ruling elite and that is culturally and historically determined" (MR at
1270 n.3), Kelman spends the better part of two chapters attempting to
distance cls from such unreflective functionalist views; indeed, Kelman explicitly rejects claims that law does anything "simply" and denies that expressions like "serves the interests of the ruling elite" and "historically
determined" represent meaningful concepts, let alone useful ways of understanding the rich and complex relationship between law and society

(chs. 7-8).
Kelman's argument begins with cls elaborations of several traditional
critiques of functionalism (at 244-53). Citing cls and other studies that
"demonstrate that apparently similar social conditions have generated disparate legal responses, both cross-culturally and within the same culture"
(at 245-46 & nn.13-16)-as well as works that remind us of the vast
chasm that may frequently lie between the law on the books and the law in
practice (at 246 & nn.17-19)-Kelman notes our nigh complete inability
to identify with any regularity or precision either the legal reactions to
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which particular social conditions ostensibly give rise or, conversely, the
legal causes that are supposed to bring about social change. Moreover,
Kelman identifies cls work that vigorously challenges both the general
functionalist assumption that "the direction of causality [in the development of law] is wholly from private desire to public response" (at 251), and
the vulgar Marxist version of it--once again wrongly attributed to cls by
Massey (MR at 1270 n.3)-that asserts that the law is "dominate[d]" by
"elite[s]" (at 248). As Kelman notes (id.; see also 251-53), even the most
"hard left" of cls scholars
seem to find it far harder [than traditional Marxist historians] to believe that elites dominate each decision that is made, whether because
the legal system may be relatively autonomous, because ideological
consistency imperatives may overcome result orientation, or simply
because less is at stake materially in each intrasystemic dispute than
the elite dominance theorists at least sometimes imply.
Indeed, the principal contribution of cls scholarship to the study of the
relationship between law and society is precisely the opposite of the "elite
state capture" theory suggested by Massey's various characterizations. As
Kelman argues at some length, cls scholars have for the most part been
more interested in the effects of law on society than they have in the effect
of society-elite and otherwise-on law (at 249-57). Drawing (id.) on the
work of Mark Tushnet, 39 Karl Klare, 40 Jerry Frug, 41 and especially Robert
Gordon, 42 Kelman argues that law "significantly defines the actors who are
frequently pictured [by the functionalists] as the social base that influences
law" (at 253, emphasis in original), and that the conceptual structure of
legal thought and discourse often frames and limits our "understandings
of the issues at stake" (at 250).4 3 Critical scholarship is thus notable for its
notion of a mutually constitutive and interpenetrating relationship between law and society and hence for its rejection of the simplistic functionalism attributed to it by Massey.
Massey's single attempt to provide concrete evidentiary support for
his contrary claim-his assertion that "Kelman thinks the abortion liberal39. "Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's 'A History of American Law,'" 1977 Wis. L Rev. 81.
40. "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal

Consciousness, 1937-1941," 62 Minn. L Rev. 265 (1978).
41. "The City as a Legal Concept," 93 Harv. L Rev. 1057 (1980).
42. "Critical Legal Histories," 36 Stan. L Rev. 57 (1984).
43. Remarkably, Kelman leaves out of this part of his discussion Duncan Kennedy's
unpublished magnum opus on legal consciousness--clearly the seminal work of this genrewhich has been circulating in manuscript form since the mid-1970s. A portion of this important piece finally saw the light of day in Duncan Kennedy, "Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America,

1850-1940," 3 Res. L & Soc. 3 (1980).
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ization wrought by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 'may have been
responsive primarily to the demands.., of men who wanted to strip women of a major socially functional barrier (fear of pregnancy) to men's
demands for sexual access' " (MR at 1270 n.2)-is a complete failure, and
an embarrassing one at that. The source of the view expressed in the
quoted passage is Andrea Dworkin, and Kelman does indeed offer it as an
example of the "elite state capture" theory Massey describes (at 247 &
n.27, citing a passage from Dworkin's Right-Wing Women (1983)). But
while Kelman concedes that individual cls scholars have occasionally advanced views consistent with such a theory (at 247 & nn.22-23)-and
have cited works from outside the movement that adopt it (id. &
nn.24-27)-Kelman makes it perfectly clear that he rejects this view and in
point of fact introduces the passage that Massey quotes with the observation that "the trend in CLS is toward skepticism of the sorts of claims I
shall now review" (at 247, emphasis added). If there were any remaining
doubt on the matter, Kelman moves on two pages later to describe the
scholarly work of Tushnet, Klare, Frug, and Gordon--outlined in the previous paragraph-that vigorously rejects such notions of "elite state capture" (at 249-57). In sum, then, not only does Kelman not subscribe to the
position Massey attributes to him and to cls; he goes to some length to
44
dispute it.
The difference between the crude functionalism Massey attributes to
cIs and the far more complex theoretics that cls scholars have actually developed and deployed can perhaps best be understood through a close
examination of Massey's related assertions that Kelman "dismisses democratic processes (the electoral system is 'simply ...a blinding deflection')"
and "thinks distinctions between courts and legislatures wholly irrelevant"
44. For examples of similarly sloppy reading by Massey, compare MR at 1273 n.11
(suggesting that Kelman accepts a naive Hohfeldian analysis of "correlativ[e]" rights and
duties "between individuals") with Kelman at 279-84 (criticizing that version of Hohfeldian
analysis); and compare MR at 1285 (asserting that cls "fails to come to grips with the fact
that legal norms often go wholly unobserved") with Kelman at 246 (noting the importance
of that very insight to the clscritique of functionalism).
To be fair to Massey, it should be noted that in an earlier review of the Guide Judge
Posner misread the abortion passage in exactly the same way. See Posner, Wall St. 1., 27 Jan.
1988, at 23 (cited in note 14) (asserting that Kelman "thinks the decision in Roe vs. Wade
may have been intended to give men freer access to women by reducing the consequences of
an accidental pregnancy"). On the other hand, the content and wording of this and other
points in Massey's piece bear such a striking resemblance to the corresponding points in
Posner's that it is difficult to ascribe the identical misreadings to coincidence. Compare
Posner (asserting that Kelman's book is "marred by stridency and turgidity, as well as by
exaggeration and a patronizing tone") with MR at 1270 n.2 (book is "turgid, strident, ...
exaggerated, and condescending"); and compare Posner (asserting that Kelman attacks efforts "to depict law as a reasonably objective, reasonably disinterested, reasonably nonpartisan, reasonably civilized method for resolving conflicts and securing . . .widely shared
values") with MR at 1270 (Kelman challenges "the notion that law is a reasonably neutral,
objective, and civilized method for resolving conflicts and maintaining widely shared societal
values"). Massey, however, never mentions Posner's review.
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(MR at 1281). Far from "dismiss[ing] democratic processes," Kelman
stresses (at 198) that few if any cis scholars "denigrate the real significance
of traditional electoral participation in the Western democracies; I, for
one, certainly have no doubt that, because we can vote, we are significantly
empowered to control aspects of the direction of community life that
would be far harder to control by other means." Kelman's point is yet
again precisely the opposite of the one suggested by Massey: Compared
with liberal ideals, our institutions are nowhere near democratic enough.
Thus, Kelman identifies the distorting effects of class and race on the ability of many citizens to participate in democratic self-governance, though
his arguments are structural and systemic in nature and bear scant resemblance to Massey's characterization of them as tantamount to the naive
functionalist claim that "the legislature is essentially a collection of racist,
elitist, venal stooges of the dominant economic elite" (MR at 1283). Drawing extensively on an article by Richard Parker, 45 Kelman argues instead
that our aspirations to genuinely representative self-governance are undermined by such factors as the alienation of many nonvoters who may be
"discouraged, disengaged because of their powerlessness, withdrawn because they are aware that they would be unable to bring their distinct
agendas to fruition" (at 196); the relative ineffectiveness of many citizens
who do participate because "the capacity to act in the political sphere is
not just randomly distributed but class correlated" (at 196-97); the fact
that "what counts as a plausible topic for legislative debate may be far
more class biased than decisions within the constricted agenda would appear to be" (at 197, emphasis added); the existence "of lobbying, of backroom dealing, of unscrutinized last-minute changes in technically complex
legislation about which some constituencies are far better informed than
others" (id.); and the likelihood that the voice of "groups that tend to be
outsiders in the political process (like prisoners)" will not be heard "when
they are represented by people who may have only a general, weak concern
for their welfare" (id.).
But even these systemic class-related impediments to genuine self-governance pale in comparison with the phenomenon that, as Kelman correctly notes, cls scholars have always emphasized: the relative absence of
democratic control over what our traditions of legal discourse treat as "private" sector institutions, whose decisions vitally affect the lives of citizens
every bit as much as do those of the state (at 197-99; see also 102-9).
Thus, as Kelman observes, cls has vigorously challenged the exclusive focus on the "public" sphere of social life that characterizes the work of
many mainstream scholars "ostensibly concerned with disempowerment"
(at 198).46 Kelman explains (at 198-99, emphasis in original):
45. "The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its Future," 42 Ohio St. Li. 223 (1981).
46. There he goes again, suggesting with yet another condescending adverb that what
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Most of our daily experiences of thorough disempowerment, of subjection to the kinds of power we associate with truly totalitarian imagery, are in relation to people who are in the liberal imagination's
private sphere, whether teachers, husbands, or, most significant in the
Marxist tradition, bosses.... [Tihe struggle for fuller empowerment
in that critical sphere seems so skew to the issue of, say, overreaching
courts that one wonders whether . . . [cIs] and those in the mainstream are observing the same world of powerlessness.
Thus, Kelman's argument is not at all, as Massey would have it, that "the
electoral system is 'simply ...

a blinding deflection'" (MR at 1281)-let

alone is it that "distinctions between courts and legislatures [are] wholly
irrelevant" (id.). Rather, the "blinding deflection" to which Kelman refers
is the nearly exclusive focus of traditional liberal scholarship on the "problem" of the supposedly undemocratic nature of adjudication-a focus that
blandly assumes that our current legislative structures are by contrast the
modern equivalent of the New England Town Meeting and that in any
event virtually ignores the existence of a vast terrain of purportedly "private" decision making where democracy dare not tread (at 200). 47
Massey concludes his argument here with the same punchline he delivered with his claims about choice and determinism, asserting that
"[piresumably the dictatorship of an enlightened elite in a utopian postliberal world is the answer served up by CLS" (MR at 1281-82; see also id.
at 1290). Now Massey does not contend-nor can he, given the factsthat either Kelman or anyone else associated with cls has ever actually said
such a thing or anything like it; rather, he calls his view of the cls position
a "hunch" (id. at 1282). How Massey arrives at this "hunch"-how he
could conceivably conclude, from a series of cls insights about the way in
is involved is deliberate and self-conscious rather than simply an artifact of the very structures of thought cls has endeavored to identify and critique.
47. Massey altogether misses this facet of Kelman's argument, perhaps in part because
its causal valance runs in a direction precisely opposite the simple elite-interests-determinelaw functionalism he seems to see in every nook and cranny of cls thought. This is ironic
indeed, given Massey's not-so-subtle Red baiting. See, e.g., MR at 1274 (referring to the
"perhaps Marxist perspective of CLS"); id. at 1281-82 ("[plresumably the dictatorship of an
enlightened elite in a utopian post-liberal world is the answer served up by CLS"); id. at
1289 & n.50 (noting that Kelman "claims not to know" what a better world would look
like, but asserting that "[i]t is hard to take th[is] claim seriously, given the evident fascination of CLS thinkers with Marxist tropes"); id. at 1290 (suggesting that cls supports an
"authoritarian radical-left vision of a neo-Marxist community"). As Kelman says of the cls
critique of the public/private distinction in liberal legalism, critical scholarship is "perhaps
more traditionally Marxist in this regard than in any other I can discern" (at 198); compare
the argument in text with, e.g., Georg Lukics, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in

Marxist Dialectics 83-222 (R. Livingstone, trans.; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971).
Thus, Massey missed his best chance to paint cls with the broad brush of Marxism and
make his claims stick.
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which law and society are mutually constitutive and in which legal thought
may distort our ability to imagine a more authentically democratic community, that what cls is "really" after is a "dictatorship"-is the subject of the
48
next section.

II. ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS
A. The "Vision" Thing
Throughout his review of the Guide, Massey repeatedly refers to the

existence of a "utopian CLS vision" (MR at 1275; see also id. at 1274,
1282, 1295 & n.84), and repeatedly chides Kelman and other cls scholars
for their "refusal" to "disclose the details" of that "vision" (id. at 1275
(twice); see also id. at 1271, 1289); indeed, Massey repeatedly suggests that
cls scholars might not even "kno[w]" the contents of that "vision" themselves (id. at 1275 (twice); see also id. at 1289). It never seems to occur to
Massey that he might be the one with the "vision" thing-that it is his
agenda at work here, not ours. I refer not to his Red baiting, although
that is too obvious to be anything but intentional. 49 I refer instead to
Massey's not-so-tacit premise that you've just got to have a "vision" if you
want your legal scholarship to be taken seriously.
Consider, for example, Massey's abrupt dismissal of Kelman's examination and critique of liberalism's contradictions:
For there to be significance in these criticisms it is essential that Kelman establish both that there is some escape from the incoherence he
sees and that there is a moral or practicalfailure of the liberal world he
describes.... Even if CLS criticisms are meaningful, there is no alternative vision described in anything other than the most general or abstract terms. (Id. at 1271, emphasis added)
Just what is Massey saying? That it doesn't matter whether cls is rightwhether its insights and arguments help us better to understand the recurring conceptual structures of legal thought and argument? That such insights lack "significance" and are just not "meaningful" if we don't
propose some means of "escape" from those underlying structures? That
even if our criticisms are "meaningful" and "significant," we should keep
them to ourselves unless and until we can offer an "alternative vision"?
Indeed, the payoff comes when Massey demands not only that cls scholars
48. It is tempting to speculate what the result would be if I were to try to convince a
respectable law journal to permit me to publish the suggestion that scholars associated with,
say, the Federalist Society want to impose a "dictatorship of an enlightened elite in a utopian post-liberal world" and to offer as authoritative support only my "hunch." But I won't.
49. See discussion at note 47 supra.
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propose a means of "escape"-an "alternative vision"--but also that we
"establish" that "there is a moral or practicalfailure in the liberal world [cIs]
describes." Now there's a tall order. (Or half-order, anyway; if I were attempting to defend the current "liberal world," I don't think that I would
even mention the possibility of "practical failure," given the current crises
in our airline, agriculture, automobile, banking, computer hardware, education, health care, insurance, mass transit, and retail merchandising industries; the simultaneous degradation of city, suburban, and rural life;
and the catatonic response of our politics and our governing institutions
to all of the above.) But in insisting that cls must "establish" that liberal
legalism is a "moral failure," Massey has unwittingly stacked the deck:
How can cls (or anyone else, for that matter) discharge that burden unless
we indulge in the conceit that we have access to some moral yardsticksome "alternative vision"-against which we can make such a judgment?
As I said a moment ago, then, this "vision" thing is Massey's; he is the one
who insists that cls must point the way to some "utopian post-liberal
world" (MR at 1282).50
The apologetic assumptions embedded in this kind of argument-and
the dissent-silencing effects that attend their widespread acceptance-may
be difficult to see when it is our own professional habits of thinking and
structures of discourse that are at issue. But they are embarrassingly obvious when examined in the context of another discipline. Let us pretend,
for example, that we are research scientists attempting to find a cure for
some deadly infectious disease. Let us further assume that there is a drug
already on the market that has thus far proven to be reasonably effective
in delaying the onset of the illness among those already infected and in
diminishing the symptoms once the disease takes hold. Now imagine that
a group of young researchers publishes a series of follow-up studies that
strongly suggest that the drug in question causes side effects that are obscured in the early stages by the symptoms of the underlying disease, but
that in the long term independently produce horrible consequences. Consider our likely reaction to an evaluation of those follow-up studies that
mirrored Massey's critique of cls, particularly if it was published by someone whose own research was called into question by the new studies:
For there to be significance in these studies it is essential that the
authors establish that there is some escape from the side effects they
see. Even if their criticisms are meaningful, there is no alternative
50. To be completely accurate, Massey does not seem to take personal responsibility
for making these demands; rather, he simply invokes the subtle but imposing authority of
the Brooding Omnipresence with a passive construction. "[l]t is essential," he declares, that
our insights and arguments meet his criteria if we want them to be "meaningful" and "significant" (id. at 1271, emphasis added). (As Pierre Schlag would say, "Look, ma, no
subject!")
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treatment described in anything other than the most general or abstract terms.
Placed in this less familiar context, the critique can be seen for what it is: a
desperate attempt at turf protection that is utterly beside the point on the
merits. Indeed, the young researchers might respond, how can a responsible search for the "alternative treatment" that might provide an "escape"
from the current predicament even be contemplated without an honest
and painstaking examination of the predicament itself?5'
I can almost hear my mother's likely reaction to all of this: "Honey,
why don't you and your friends just answer their question? Would that
really be asking so much? What would you put in its place?" Well, Mom,
we can't answer that question, and that's what's so weird about critical
legal studies. We can't because the question itself presupposes virtually
every assumption about law and legal scholarship that we are attempting
to bring to the surface and to call into question. We can't because we just
don't think that "the law" works in anything remotely like the way that
the question suggests, and we don't entertain the delusions of grandeur
evidently harbored by those who think that the question can be addressed
in a "significant" and "meaningful" manner.
What would you put in its place? indeed. As the earlier discussion of the
cls critique of functionalism illustrates, it is simply not very useful to talk
about law in general-or about its liberal legalist variant in particular-as
if it had a "place." The point of critical scholarship is that the law is far
better understood as a significant aspect of the complex interplay between
our culture and our structures of thought than it is as something that has
some sort of room of "its" own. We can't step outside of "law" and look
at it; we are looking at us. 52 And although it is surely the case that some of
51. In fact, it is not at all difficult to imagine a reaction of the medical or scientific
establishment to the hypothetical follow-up studies that would look a lot more like Massey's
critique of cis than my argument suggests; that, I gather, is a principal lesson of Thomas
Kuhn's pathbreaking work, The Structure of Scientic Revolutions (2d ed. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1970). But it may sometimes be easier to identify the apologetics of normal science in a field other than one's own, since the constraints of the dominant orienting
paradigms and/or of self-interested stakes in the "system" may exert less force on the outsider than on those who work within the discipline in question. To cite an example of this
phenomenon that I found particularly striking when it occurred, in 1986 1delivered a paper
on the Realist-cis indeterminacy critique to a convention of undergraduate pre-law advisers,
most of whom were, as it turned out, political scientists. I had fully expected my arguments
to cause great controversy-I had friends elsewhere in legal academia who were, after all,
getting fired for articulating such views-but the reaction of most of my audience that day
was something like, "You all are just figuring that out?" (The only person publicly to take
issue with my views was, naturally, a conference participant who was a retired local judge.)
52. Quite apart from its extraordinary usefulness as a teaching tool, the key insight of
Jeremy Paul's "bedtime story"-in which a child attempts to convince her baby-sitter to
permit her to stay up past her usual bedtime-is its demonstration of the many ways in
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us speak as if we have found a vantage point from which to examine this
interplay "from the outside"-a privileged position of our own, so to
speak-I suspect that most critical scholars would readily admit that the
opposite is the case, that we experience the same contradictory beliefs and

impulses (self vs. other, public vs. private, rules vs. standards, intentionalism vs. determinism, etc.) as everyone else. 53 The difference lies in our

attempts at self-conscious awareness of these antinomies and their animating conceptual structures-and in our sense that this is a legitimate and in
fact vital area of scholarly inquiry if we are to avoid mere apologetics-not
54
in our successes thus far in overcoming them.
And if the notion of law's "place" is problematic, what are we to

make of the suggestion that the law can be "put" at all? Again, a principal
contribution of critical scholarship lies in its rejection of the claim that "the
direction of causality [in the development of law] is wholly from private
desire to public response" (at 251). Again, the critical view has been that
law and society are mutually constituting; there is simply no way for us to
"put" law in its "place" because it is always and already (t)here. Moreover,

the assumption that it is meaningful to talk on a broad scale about the
which our everyday experience of moral contention matches quite closely with the conflicting rhetorical structures of legal argument. See Jeremy Paul, "A Bedtime Story," 74 Va. L
Rev. 915 (1988). Paul elaborates this point thoughtfully and persuasively in 69 Tex. L Rev.
at 1815-20 (cited in note 4).
53. The use by cls scholars of "liberalism" or "liberal legalism" as a short-hand description of the dominant cultural/professional/ideological assumptions we are attempting to
explore and criticize may well account for the not uncommon impression that we think we
have somehow transcended these contradictory modes of thinking, rather than (not so)
simply attempting to bring them into view. That, I take it, is Mark Hager's point in his
excellent review of the Guide: "I cannot see what could be thought specifically liberal about
the contradictions identified-rules/standards, value objectiviry/subjectivity, free choice/determinism. They can, it seems, more plausibly be viewed as existential or structural than as
specifically liberal." Mark Hager, "Against Liberal Ideology: A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies, by Mark Kelman," 37 Am. U.L Rev. 1051, 1057 (1988) (book review) (emphases in
original). That the modes of thought at issue are not the exclusive domain of those who
might commonly be referred to in legal, academic, or political life as "liberals" is surely right,
though that is a much narrower meaning of "liberalism" than most cls scholars have intended since Roberto Unger offered a rather more capacious description of it in Knowledge
and Politics at, e.g., 6-7 (cited in note 22). For this reason, I think that Pierre Schlag has
made a brilliant, even discourse-shifting move in identifying "normative legal thought" as
the target that is also our situation, since that expression avoids some of the "just-who-areyou-including-here" confusion that attends the use of "liberalism." (On the other hand, it
may simply generate a larger class of enemies.)
54. As my colleague Steve Winter has argued:
There is no way to get outside of time and existence, no way to escape the field of social
interaction that is the self and that the action of the self maintains, no way to transcend-even for a moment-the constitutive action in which the self is already situated
and in which the self is always implicated. Sometimes, we can relax the particular
scheme by which we separate subject-from-object-from-context long enough to attend
to the ways in which it constructs our world. But there is never a moment of privilege
because there is never a moment outside a process of construction. What is possibleand all that is possible-are studied acts of situated self-consciousness.
"Without Privilege," 139 U. Pa. L Rev. 1063, 1068 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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ways in which we might remake social life solely through a change in legal
rules and structures partakes of precisely the kind of crude functionalist

fantasy that critical scholars have long sought to debunk. Thus, even if we
had a program, we are perhaps more aware than anyone else of the slim

possibility that we could "put" it anywhere-let alone that it would have
55
anything like the intended effect once it got there.

Which brings us to the "you." What would you put in its place? is not,
after all, addressed to the members of Congress or to the Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court-folks who do indeed expend a great deal of time
and effort at projects that perhaps in some vastly oversimplified meaning
of the expression could be viewed as "put[ting]" the law in its "place."
Presumably, the "you" is instead law professors who, to judge from my own
experience anyway, write law review articles that are read mostly by (1) the
author's friends and the more industrious scholars who work in the author's field; (2) the author's strongest supporters and/or opponents on the
promotion and tenure committee, and/or the outside reviewers each
group may hire to assist them with their tasks; (3) law clerks to busy judges,
who almost invariably cite the article in question for precisely the opposite
point of the one the author was trying to make and not always with a "but
see"; (4) two groups of students: (a) a handful of law review editors, most
of whom focus on the accuracy of citation in a particular section or passage
and never even see the entire piece, and (b) the slightly larger number who
take a class in the relevant field from the author and (here's the "slightly"
part) do all the assigned reading for the course; and (5) the more courageous and/or foolhardy members of the author's close family. Putting the
best face on it, we are talking mostly to each other and our students, an
important task indeed. But you would never suspect that this is the audience at stake from reading most legal scholarship, since we almost invariably write as we were playing Merlin to the Supreme Court's Wart and the
55. 1 am reminded of a faculty seminar I gave at the beginning of my second year at
Miami. Although I had practiced labor law for five years before entering academia, I had
never noticed until I attempted to teach the subject for the first time that virtually all of the
statutory, administrative, and judicial exclusions of working people from the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act--e.g., managerial employees, supervisors, independent contractors, students (like hospital house staff)-seemed to reflect precisely the same set of
cultural-legal assumptions about the importance of separating employment from ownership
and of distinguishing the conception of work from its mere execution. My senior colleagues
listened politely and asked their usual slew of thoughtful and interesting questions, but the
session nearly fell apart when I was asked (you guessed it) what I though should be done
about all of this. When they were not satisfied with various versions of my initial response-"Isn't it enough that I've seen something no one else has ever noticed?"--I could
no longer suppress the bad boy in me and provided the answer that a handful had feared all
along: "Transfer the means of production to the working classes." (The response I would
give today: "Amend the Labor Act to instruct NLRB members, judges, and labor lawyersnot to mention working people and their employers-to stop thinking this way about
work." Whatever else can be said for a decade of experience in legal academia, it has greatly
sharpened my sense of irony.)
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Justices were listening attentively, attuned to our every nuance; indeed, we
often write as if we were a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least a
56
legal academic's idealized version of one.
Viewed this way, the fear that cls seeks a "dictatorship of an enlightened elite" begins to look a lot like a massive neurotic projection: It is the
critics of cis who seem to believe they are sitting on the shoulders of
judges, offering sound and solemn normative prescriptions for how best to
"iput" law in its "place"; it is otherwise hard to fathom why they keep
asking how we think we might go their imaginary enterprise one better.
No wonder, then, that critical scholars who are not even interested in trying to answer that question-who insist instead on taking it apart and
showing all of its conclusion-assuming premises-are perceived as so
threatening. We are tugging like Toto at the curtains of mainstream legal
57
thought.
56. As Pierre Schlag has astutely observed:
Not surprisingly, those theories that are the most popular within the legal academy are
those that project the most attractive self-image. Consider, as an example, Dworkin's
theory of law as integrity and his depiction of the ideal judge as "Hercules." ... Regardless of whether Hercules is an accurate or a desirable model of the appellate judge, he
certainly resonates profoundly in the self-image of the contemporary legal academic.
Indeed, it is easy to understand Hercules as the projection of the legal academic's idealized self-image onto the character of the appellate judge. Similarly, Dworkin's theory of
law as integrity can easily be understood as a projection of the kind of elegant theoryconstruction that characterizes the most esteemed legal scholarship onto the appellate
judicial opinion writing process.
139 U. Pa. L Rev. at 844-45 (citation omitted) (cited in note 17).
57. There is a considerable body of cls-associated work that does offer what look for all
the world like "constructive" proposals, many of them quite concrete and within the realm
of the politically plausible. See, e.g., Karl Klare, "Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform," 38 Cath. U.L Rev. 1 (1988). Those who insist
that cls has never engaged The Question either ignore this work, dismiss it as unresponsive
to the broader normative enterprise, or strike the pose of what Jerry Frug has called the
''modest realist":
[M]odest realists tend to respond to their critics' concrete suggestions for change in the
manner of a sober grown-up addressing a naive child. If the suggestion is "in the
ballpark," they treat it as one more factor that needs to be "weighed" against a host of
other competing factors, and the likelihood that they will accept the suggestion is low.
Chances are that it has already been weighed and found overridden by other factors, or
has already been taken into account to the extent that it has merit, or has yet to develop a sufficient track record to be seriously considered, or is simply too trivial a revision of the status quo to be worth pursuing. If, on the other hand, the suggestion
proposes some radical change, the modest realist dismisses it out of hand as utopian.
"Things are complicated and difficult," one almost hears the modest realist saying, "Of
course we have a long way to go. But everything is a tough policy choice, and every
decision we make will have its faults. All we can do is the best we can."
Gerald E. Frug, "The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law," 97 Hart. L Rev. 1276,
1383 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

The upshot is a double-bind for those doing critical scholarship: Refuse to engage The
Question, and your arguments are either dismissed as insignificant or mischaracterized as
dangerous. Engage The Question, and your proposals are ignored, conventionalized, or
dismissed as utopian. All this reveals a great deal more about the rhetorical structures that
fortify mainstream legal thought against critique than about the supposed failure of the
critics to come up with "constructive" proposals of their own.
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B.

Normativity Redux

The mainstream assumption that legal scholarship must above all
other things be prescriptive-normativity uber alles, as Massey might put it
were he in our position-has a multitude of distorting effects that Pierre
Schlag and his critique-of-normativity confreres have begun to unearth
and criticize. My principal point here is that the relentless What would you
put in its place? thinking of mainstream scholars has been the principal
source of their systematic misreading and misunderstanding of cls work:
Armed with only a hammer, everything around them begins to look a lot
like a nail. It is accordingly a short leap from the mainstream premise that
cls should be normative to the assumption that it is so-that it does have a
"vision" or a program, and that the refusal of its adherents to disclose it
strongly suggests that they have something truly awful to hide. They must
be Stalinists.
Listen one last time to Massey (MR at 1275, emphasis in original):
Kelman's refusal, or inability, to disclose the details of the utopian
CLS vision saps much of the force from his contention that rules and
standards are hopelessly in conflict and operate to prop up the ancien
regime. My suspicion is that Kelman would simply prefer a capture of
the legal system from within, by substituting his privileged constructs
for those he sees currently in place, without revealing, or even knowing, the nature of the substantive change thereby wrought.
We can now begin to understand how the "vision" thing---operating
against the backdrop of the patterned contradictions of liberal legal
thought-might lead mainstream readers to think they see a hidden
agenda of a particular kind in the cls critique of the privileged positions. If
your working assumption is that legal scholarship must be programmaticmust provide an "alternative vision" and describe a means of "escape"
from our current practices-then Kelman's critique of the privileging of
(for example) intentionalism must be deployed in the service of some alternative, of "substituting his privileged constructs for those he sees currently
in place" (id., emphasis in original). And if you work within an epistemic
framework in which everything is (to continue the same example) either
intended or determined, then the preferred alternative must be the mirror
image of the intentionalism Kelman so astutely deconstructs-to wit, determinism. Bingo: Critical legal studies is B. F. Skinner and beyond either
freedom or dignity.
This, then, may well be how scholars like Massey can come to wild
conclusions like "[t]he CLS vision is of a world where choice is illusory,
where we are all determined by extrinsic factors" (id. at 1294). But not
only is this claim just plain wrong on the facts-as I have argued at some
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length, nothing in the cls critique of intentionalism even remotely supports such a characterization-it is also a product of the very intellectual
structure we are trying to explore and to challenge. For it is liberal legalism
that first insists on a "vision" and then presents the debate about its content in either/or intentionalism-versus-determinism terms, thus fashioning
a context in which legal scholarship becomes a sort of referendum through
which individual academics cast their votes for one or the other depending
on the doctrinal context. By contrast, critical scholars are far more interested in the underlying phenomenon itself: Why do we--conservatives,
liberals, and left-progressives alike-seem to divide up our experience of
the world in this way? And what are the implications of our doing so for
58
legal thought and practice?

III.

WHO ARE THE BRAIN POLICE?

We can now begin to account for the striking regularity with which
mainstream legal scholars get their facts wrong when they discuss and analyze critical scholarship. Whether it's Dean Paul Carrington calling Roberto Unger-Roberto Unger!-a "nihilist"5 9 or Ronald Dworkin making
the ridiculous and utterly undocumented claim that some within cls deploy
their arguments in the "service of undisclosed political goals,"' 6 normative
legal thought cannot be very far behind. To further explore the analytical
structures that have helped to produce this state of affairs, let us turn to
several other reviews of Kelman's Guide and watch as scholars as diverse as
58. The greatest difficulty that cis may face here is to avoid an essentialist leap that
would elevate this experience of contradiction to ontological status, concealing the prospect
that it is a particular and situated epistemological moment (albeit a really long one) in the
construction of which we are ourselves deeply implicated. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson,
"Contradiction and Critical Legal Studies," 10 Cardozo L Rev. 1833, 1854 (1989) (book
review) ("For Hegel, contradiction has meaning, and more! Contradiction, for Hegel, is the
very substance of our lives. It is not to be regretted or denied but embraced as both the fact
of our finitude and our salvation from it") (emphasis in original). In this connection, my
colleague Steve Winter is surely right when he argues that critical scholars and mainstream
legal thinkers alike seem to "participate in exactly the same understanding of objectivity and
subjectivity as mutually entailed, dichotomous choices." Steven L. Winter, Foreword: "On
Building Houses," 69 Tex. L Rev. 1595, 1597 (1991).
59. See Paul D. Carrington, "Of Law and the River," 341J. Legal Educ. 222, 227 & n.21
(1984). As Robert Gordon observed in his thoughtful response to Dean Carrington's claim:
[W]hom is it realistic to call a nihilist? Surely not a romantic Christian Hegelian like
Roberto Unger, who has just set off to spend several years of his life doing grass-roots
political organizing in Brazil; there are few people anywhere in the world who have
given more effort to constructing a theory of social transformation and shown more
courage in trying to carry it out in practice: in his case at least, the proper analogy is
not the one you suggest to an atheist in a divinity school, but rather to a liberation
theologian.
Letter from Robert W. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington, in "'Of Law and the River,' and of
Nihilism and Academic Freedom," 35 J. Legal Educ. 1, 13, 14-15 (1985).
60. Dworkin, Law's Empire 275 (cited in note 30). Presumably, he has a list of names.
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Richard Barnes, Daniel Farber, and Eugene Genovese drink from precisely
the same waters as Massey. Although these individuals do not undertake
anything like the detailed critique of the Guide offered by Massey, we will
see that the pertinent portions of their reviews nevertheless replicate the

basic structure of his analysis: (1) ask the What would you put in its place?
question and insist that an adequate response must provide an "alternative vision"; (2) infer from the absence of an articulated vision that there
may well be a program (invariably some form of a "dictatorship of an enlightened elite in a utopian post-liberal world") hidden between the lines
of cls work-a program so well hidden, in fact, that it turns out on close
examination not to be there at all. For easy reference, we'll refer to the
two moves thus: Ask the question/demandan alternative vision; Posit a hidden

61
program/get the facts wrong.

61. It should perhaps be noted that the penchant for asking the What would you put in
its place? question is sometimes observable among cls insiders as well. Consider, for example,
the review of the Guide written by John Stick, who has closely identified himself with what
he calls a "countertradition" within cls-a tradition that he defines in terms of its rejection
of the "mainstream" cls view on indeterminacy and legitimation. 88 Colum. L Rev. at 408
(cited in note 13). Drawing on an earlier piece, Stick argues that Kelman and other critical
scholars find a "failure of moral and political justification" in the materials of legal decision
making because they are testing those materials against a model of rationality that is very
different from-and much more restrictive than-the one that common law lawyers and
judges actually deploy. Id. at 413 & n.18, citing John Stick, "Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?"
100 Harv. L Rev. 332, 345-69 (1986). Legal reasoning, the argument goes, is not confined
to logical deduction or something akin to "mathematical calculation"-as the crits assertedly assume-but rather includes the active use of "legal culture, conventions, common
sense, and politics." 100 Harv. L Rev. at 356; see also 88 Colum. L Rev. at 413.
Stick gives a fair sketch of the experience of legal reasoning, but what his account
misses is what Steve Winter has identified as the discontinuity between that experience and
the practice of legal argument and justification. See 137 U. Pa. L Rev. at 1180-98 (cited in
note 27). Thus, with rare exception, the rhetoric of legal argument-whether used by a
lawyer to attempt to persuade a court or by a judge to attempt to justify a result-is a
rhetoric of constraint, entailment, and necessity. To be sure, we expect the "legal culture,
conventions, common sense, and politics" that Stick describes to have a profound impact
on the ways a lawyer or judge will actually think about a case; that is one of the most interesting points of Duncan Kennedy's insightful piece on the phenomenology of judging. See
"Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology," 36 J. Legal Educ.
518 (1986). But we would think it highly unusual if the lawyer in her brief-or the judge in
her decision-relied on any of those factors as a reason for reaching a particular result in a
particular case.
The point, then, is that critical scholars are measuring the practice of legal argument
against liberal legalism's own professions of constraint and entailment, not against some
external standard of "moral and political justification" that cls has independently embraced.
Thus, Stick is making the same mistake that Massey made, confusing critical analysis with a
form of normative argument that may reveal more about his own rationalist commitmentshowever much they differ from Massey's-than about the views held by other critical
scholars.
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A. Richard Barnes
Ask the question/demand an alternativevision. In his review of the Guide
(cited as BR), 62 Professor Barnes argues that the book is a "failure" because
of Kelman's "inability to make a positive case for CLS by showing that
CLS itself posits something other than destruction of the current legal
order" (BR at 221).63 The required "something," Barnes insists, must con-

sist of the elaboration of "an alternative" to liberalism and "some articulation of the underlying normative propositions"; cls must offer "a
'coherent' legal model of its own" (id. at 222). The contributions of critical scholarship in identifying and exploring the patterned contradictions
of liberalism are not enough, according to Barnes, for "criticism of the
current legal system as being incoherent without a model of how it could
be coherent is not likely to engage or entertain those of us who participate
in it" (id.). In the absence of "some positive model, some alternative," cls
criticisms just aren't "relevan[t]" (id. at 221-22) to mainstream readers and
can "d[o] no one any lasting good" (id. at 222).
Posit a hidden alternative/get the facts wrong. Yet cls might have an "alternative program" up its sleeve after all, for according to Barnes (id. at
220, emphasis added and footnote omitted):
While there are hints of the Marxist bent of many CLS adherents, for the
most part, [Kelman] leaves the reader to speculate on what CLS is.
There is little to suggest what the legal system would be like if reshaped along CLS lines. The picture of the CLS program that coalesces is
of some metaphysical anti-matteropposed to the mainstream matterof "liberalism" in the law.
62. 34 S.D.L Rev. 220 (cited in note 12).
63. According to Barnes, the book is also a "failure" because it is often such a difficult
read (id. at 223-25). He has a point: Kelman tends to pack phrases and sentences to the
bursting point and to pitch his arguments at an exceedingly abstract level. See, e.g., Guide
at 13 ("the legal system is invariably simultaneously philosophically committed to mirrorimage contradictory norms") (emphasis removed). Barnes is surely right that those characteristics make the Guide just about the last thing you would want to give to a lawyer-let
alone a lay person-looking for an introduction to cls (BR at 223).
Yet despite the title, it was surely Kelman's prerogative to address an audience of sophisticated legal academics familiar with the jurisprudential debates in which cls plays a
significant role and to attempt to enrich and refine those debates, rather than to reduce
them to some sort of primer. Indeed, sketching an account of those debates that is accessible but not simplistic is no easy task. The most successful efforts thus far can surely be
found in Robert Gordon's work, especially "New Developments in Legal Theory," in Politics
of Law 413 (cited in note 6), and "Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law,"
15 Fla. SL U.L Rev. 195 (1987). I tried my hand at it once, and the principal reaction of my
senior cls-identified colleagues was to advise me to hide the draft in some dark hole, at least
until I received tenure. At the same time, the responses of my more mainstream colleagues,
of our students and alumni, and of faculty at other schools looking for ways to introduce
their own students to cls was for the most part quite encouraging, suggesting that attempts
at translation and outreach are well worth their considerable effort. See Richard Michael
Fischl, Essay: "Some Realism about Critical Legal Studies," 41 U. Miami L Rev. 505 (1987).
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The latter point-the suggestion that cls plays "anti-matter" to liberalism's
"matter"-is reminiscent of Massey's similar conclusion that Kelman simply wants to "substitut[e] his privileged constructs for those he sees currently in place" (MR at 1275, emphasis in original). But as I argued in the
previous section, it is What would you put in its place? thinking that is doing
all the work here, not Kelman or cls: It is Barnes who presupposes the
need for and hence existence of a "CLS program"; and, finding none, he
simply assumes that its commitments would merely turn mainstream liberalism on its head.
And what, pray tell, is the "anti-matter" of liberalism? Barnes's other
point-his reference to "hints of the Marxist bent of many CLS adherents" (BR at 220)-suggests an answer. For why the word "hints"? In
point of fact, Kelman is quite clear about the intellectual debt that cls owes
Marxist theory; indeed, three of the four citations that Barnes offers in
support of his "hints" claim refer to a forthright and extended discussion
of the matter that appears in the introduction to the book and its accompanying footnotes (id. at 220 n.2, citing the Guide at 9, 10, and 300-301
n. 17).64 But Kelman's discussion focuses almost entirely on the rejection of
traditional Marxist tenets by cls scholars, whose primary focus has been on
the role of ideology-rather than material interest and class conflict-in
social life and relations. Indeed, Kelman goes on at some length (at
300-301 n.17) in the passage in question to describe critical scholars'
loss of intellectual faith in Marx's teleological determinism, his sense
that there were objective laws of historical motion that would result in
a particular transformation of social roles, even in the absence of selfconscious political action. Just as traditional liberal theory was fundamentally one-sided in its account of human experience, emphasizing
an untrammeled phenomenological perspective, dwelling on subjectivity and intentionality to the exclusion of determinist accounts that
repress the subject, so traditional Marxism lacks a cogent theory of
politics, of intentionality, of will, emphasizing only the ways in which
classes play predetermined objective roles.
64. Barnes's fourth citation-Guide at 298 n.12-refers to a lengthy note in which
Kelman astutely describes cls from the vantage point of some of its more hostile mainstream
detractors. Here is a representative passage from the argument in question:
At best [cis] may be viewed as a dissident voting bloc at faculty meetings that attempts
to prey on insecure and guilty liberal colleagues to build coalitions that will hire only
unqualified "politically correct" hacks; undo "meritocratic" (test-based) admissions
programs; force students into serving the poor at storefront clinics without any respect
for those who believe that they better serve the poor by greasing the wheels of commerce or simply feel that serving the poor is just not what they had in mind.
To the same effect, see Kelman's sarcastic reference (at 299 n.12) to mainstream academics
who fear the adoption of what they see as "the 'party platform' of the CLS wing (or is it
cell?)" at their home institutions. Barnes evidently mistook these obvious attempts at parody for "hints of the Marxist bent" among cls scholars.
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Surley this was not the "hints of the Marxist bent of many CLS adherents" that Barnes had in mind. Indeed, the quoted passage quite explicitly
rejects Barnes's tacit, and prototypically liberal, premise that we can map
the realm of the possible by embracing either untrammeled subjectivity or
relentless determinism-that we must privilege either the "matter" of liberalism or the "anti-matter" of vulgar Marxism. But if you start from that
liberal premise, then the cls rejection of liberalism can mean only one
thing, no matter what scholars associated with the movement actually say.
This would account for Barnes's otherwise enigmatic use of the word
"hints": It is not Kelman's discussion of the theoretical differences between cls and traditional Marxism that reveals the former's "Marxist
bent"; it is rather the relentless critique of liberalism. And it would also
go a long way toward explaining where Barnes might have come up with
the idea-suggested without citation six times in the two pages that follow
the "Marxist bent" remark-that the aim of cls is nothing "other than
destruction of the current legal order" (BR at 221, emphasis added; see also
id at 221-22). He certainly could not have derived that notion from a
book that goes to such great lengths to reject the functionalist fantasy that
we can remake social life simply by changing legal structures (at 242-68)nor from a movement whose principal point has been that it is ideas that
matter, and whose participants more traditional leftists routinely deride
"as hopeless idealists, preoccupied with the empty words and sham ideas
that those exercising authority use to explain their conduct" (at 10, footnote omitted). No, the notion that critical scholars are really out to
"destr[oyl the current legal order" and to offer some form of vulgar Marxism as the "anti-matter" replacement for liberalism seems to have sprung
fully formed from the head of Barnes. Or, to be more precise, from the
What would you put in its place? thinking of Barnes and others like him.

B. Daniel Farber
It should perhaps be noted at the outset that Professor Farber's review of the Guide (cited as FR) appeared not in a law journal but in the
New Republic. 65 Accordingly, one might be tempted to dismiss the opening
lines of the piece as mere hyperbole designed to grab the attention of the
magazine's neoliberal (or is it neoconservative?) lay readership (FR at 36):
"One of the few remaining strongholds of the New Left has turned out,
surprisingly enough, to be legal academia. Talk of social revolution
thunders out of Harvard Law School, and radicals stalk the halls of Stanford and the University of Wisconsin." But when as sober and thoughtful
a legal theorist as Farber makes three highly dubious claims in the space of
65. 4 Jan. 1988, at 36 (cited in note 11).
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his first two sentences, you have to worry a little about what is to follow.
After all, legal academia is a "stronghold" of the New Left in about the
same sense that it is a "stronghold" of, say, African-American women and
out gay men. Moreover, the only thing "thunder[ing]" out of Harvard
Law School is the herd of well-dressed graduates headed for jobs with large
corporate law firms. And whatever the case may be at Wisconsin, the
"radicals" at Stanford include the law school's dean, so I doubt very much
66
that they are relegated to "stalk[ing] the halls" of that august institution.
But after this brief flirtation with gonzo journalism, Farber's review soon
gets down to the now familiar task of misreading Kelman in the now familiar way.
Ask the question/demand an alternative vision. "The crits," Farber explains (FR at 39), "have seemed unwilling to explain what kind of society
they want, or what kind of social change they would like to see.... The[y]
have never tried seriously to propose concrete social changes; indeed, it is
hard to imagine what they could propose that would not be essentially
reformist." Echoing Massey's claim that Kelman's criticisms of liberalism's
contradictions are neither "meaningful" nor "significant," Farber declares
that "[t]he first time you see a crit show that a liberal position is contradictory, incoherent, and fundamentally arbitrary, you are impressed; after you
see the trick done often enough, it loses its punch" (id.). Now that's an
interesting reaction: Critical scholars demonstrate that, position after position, liberalism is "contradictory, incoherent, and fundamentally arbitrary," and Farber's reaction is that it is cls-rather than liberalism-that
has "los[t] its punch."
Posit a hidden program/get the facts wrong. Like Massey and Barnes,
Farber gets into trouble when he begins to assume that cls does, in fact,
have a program--one that is hidden between the lines of its critique. Disputing Kelman's analysis of liberalism's privileged positions, Farber argues
(id. at 39, emphases added): "One of these [privileged] norms is individual
autonomy; we require some justification for restrictions on individuals'
choices about their own lives. We think the government should have some
reason before it interferes with people's choices. This slight presumption
in favor of liberty does not strike me as unreasonable." Though we are
spared the lecture about "choices mandated for Montana cowboys by a
mandarin class of elite academic radicals," Farber makes the same intellectual error here as did Massey. In fact, the argument to which Farber is
responding is an internal critique of liberal legalism-an attempt to challenge the privileged rhetorical positions of autonomy and choice by show66. Of course, the fact that a crit is now at the helm of a leading law school might be
read to support Farber's legal-academia-is-a-stronghold-of-the-New-Left claim. On the other
hand, it might be read to undermine the popular image of crits as folks who "stalk the
halls," "thunder" about, and hang out in "strongholds."
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ing the many ways in which they misdescribe a legal and social life that is
already rife with paternalist interventions. Where, then, does Farber come
up with his baseless inference that cls favors "restrictions on" and "interfere[nce] with" private choice even in the absence of any "justification" or
"reason" for state intervention? To paraphrase Edgar Allen Poe, Farber is
listening to the sound of his own heart beating: It is his What would you put
in its place? thinking that leads him to assume that Kelman's analysis is
implicitly programmatic, and it is his either/or assumption that autonomy
and paternalism exhaust the realm of the possible that leads him to assume
that a critique of the former is the same as an embrace of the latter. The
ironic result, then, is that Farber projects onto cls the very analytical structures that Kelman and other critical scholars are attempting to question
and rethink.
Farber makes the same mistake when he discusses (id. at 38, emphasis
added) Kelman's purported attempt
to rebut the liberal belief that government should not impose a single
set of "objectively correct" values on society. One of the fundamental tenets of liberalism is tolerance toward minority religions and ways
of life.... In post-Reformation society, a wide divergence of fundamental philosophies is likely to exist unless it is forcibly suppressed.
The liberal considers tolerance better than repression. And to rebut
this view .... the crits will have to demonstrate that suppressing "undesirable" groups would be a good government policy.
Farber puts the word "undesirable" in quotes, but his review provides no
source citations and so it is impossible to tell where he came up with the
preposterous suggestion-the slightest support for which can in fact be
found in neither the Guide nor in any other cls work I have ever seenthat critical scholars think that "suppressing 'undesirable' groups would be
a good government policy." Once again, it is Farber'sassumptions that are
doing all the work here: A critique of the subjectivity of value must be an
argument in favor of something, and that something must be a relentless
and authoritarian objectivism, for what else is there?

C.

Eugene Genovese

Professor Genovese presents a far more sophisticated analysis and critique of the Guide (cited as GR)67 than those offered by Massey, Barnes,
and Farber. Among other things, Genovese identifies a common thread in
cls scholarship that few of its other critics have noticed: its frequent em67. 3 Yale J.L & Hum. 131 (cited in note 7).
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brace of a surprisingly liberal view of the primacy of the individual subject.
As he says (GR at 149):
From start to finish, in Kelman's Guide and without, [cls scholars]
proclaim their war against individualism, and from start to finish they
wallow in the individualism they purportedly war against. Kelman,
like Unger, Kennedy, and others, begins with the conflicted concerns
of the individual and ends with his liberation ....

They extol the

community (society, group) and insist that the individual expand his
personality with due respect for the personalities of others, but they
reject, virtually out of hand, the alternate concept of the prior rights
and imperatives of the community. In this respect they follow
from Hobbes
proudly in the tradition of the great bourgeois theorists
6
to Locke and Blackstone and Burke, and beyond.
Given this important insight about the unreconstructed liberalism of cls,
Genovese's readers might well expect a refreshing change from charges of
covert Stalinism and the like. But they will be disappointed, for Genovese
too finds a hidden Stalinist agenda-albeit one that is, in Genovese's
somewhat more generous view, almost surely unintended by those in the
movement (GR at 144-45). Indeed, apart from this suggestion that critical
scholars are dupes rather than fellow travelers, Genovese's critique of both
the Guide and cls more generally replicates the structure of analysis that we
have examined thus far in every significant respect.
Ask the question/demand an alternative vision. Genovese's review astutely if somewhat hyperbolically describes the Guide's "synthesis of CLS's
familiar, controversial, slashing attacks" (id. at 132) on "the liberal legal
system and its dichotomies of rules and standards, the objectivity and subjectivity of values, and the recourse to assumptions of intentionality and
determinism" (id. at 133). But Genovese quickly becomes impatient with
the seemingly endless stream of criticism and can contain The Question
no longer (id.): "There is a limit beyond which any viewpoint becomes
dull when it remains on the attack, content to assail other intellectual positions.... Time after time, a reader wants to cry out: 'Doubtless, it is all a
mess. But what, exactly, do you propose to put in place of the legal system
you are attacking?'" Genovese complains that the Guide-and cls work
generally-"demonstrate" the "contradictions, weaknesses, and failures"
of liberal legalism "in a way that merely assumes the existence of a constructive alternative" (id. at 141). But the burden on those who would
make such charges, Genovese explains, is to "elaborat[e] and defen[d]" a
68. This tendency is difficult to miss in some of Roberto Unger's work-a point developed at note 69 infra and accompanying text. But an appropriately modern-not to say
postmodern-version of it lurks awfully close to the surface in the work of many of the more
.,mainstream" cls scholars as well. See Schlag, 69 Tex. L Rev. at 1679-1705 (cited in note

17) ("Critical Legal Sartre").
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"practical alternative" to "[t]he present social order and legal system" (id.
at 134).
Like Massey before him, Genovese is a man in search of a vision.
Critical scholars, he asserts, can "justify their negativity only by laying out
a minimal social vision that gives people a sense of where they are being
led" (id. at 155). Indeed, this explicit assumption that the critical enterprise is "justif[ied]" only if it is accompanied by a constructive "social
vision" may well explain why a piece that starts out as a review of the
Guide soon mutates into an extended analysis of the collected works of
Roberto Unger (id. at 138-43, 146-55), a cls scholar who-as Genovese
observes-"does have a positive vision, does struggle to transform negative
criticism into constructive theory, does advance the outlines of a political
program" (id. at 138). But crits can't even criticize the admittedly brilliant
and provocative work of one of their own without confronting Genovese's
demand for a program to put in its place: "Unger has a vision," he observes. "The Critics may wish to dissociate themselves from it, but then
they have a responsibility to present an alternative that could represent
them as a movement" (id. at 155).69
Posit a hidden program/get the facts wrong. At times it seems as if Genovese is merely making the same argument as Massey and Barnes: When all
is said and done, cls simply must have a program, and its adherents are just
refusing to disclose it. Thus, Genovese repeatedly refers to the "political
program" of cls (id. at 132 (twice), 135, 145) and even suggests at one point
that critical scholars' "intentions and ideological stance come shining
through" despite their best efforts to conceal them (id. at 139). But for the
most part, Genovese seems to be making a somewhat different point.
Critical scholars, he contends, are telling the truth when they claim that
they have no particular program-let alone a Stalinist one-in mind.
Nevertheless, Genovese warns, their implicit "program contains totalitarian dangers," and those who "have accused the Critics of totalitarianism"
are thereby "conflat[ing] the sin with the sinner and the possible outcome
69. Ironically, the most common critique of Unger by other critical scholars is similar
to the cls-wallows-in-individualism point made by Genovese and quoted earlier. See, e.g.,
Drucilla Cornell, "Beyond Tragedy and Complacency," 81 Nw. U.L Rev. 693, 700 (1987)
(citation omitted):
[F]or Unger, attachment is always valued from the vantage point of the self, which
somehow or other is present to itself before attachment. The other is forlhe-self. [But]
the self-present-to-itself in time and space is not only a myth, but a myth based on
erasure of the mother .... For we come into this world only because we have been
attached to one who is already there when we make our entry. The mother symbolizes
our inevitable dependence on others and our tie to a world that was already there
before us; the "it was" of the past denies to the infinite, willing self the illusion of selfcreation. We do not give birth to ourselves in the continual process of self-transcendence. Instead, we endure birth as we are thrown into a pre-given environment.
Cass Sunstein is evidently the originator of the elegant if horrifying phrase, "erasure of the
mother"; he makes a point similar to Cornell's in "Routine and Revolution," 81 Nw. U.L
Rev. 869, 885 & n.63 (1987).
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with the intent" (id. at 144-45). And why does Genovese fear that the
"possible, indeed probable outcome" (id at 145) of the supposed cls program is totalitarianism? He defends this claim thus (id., emphasis added
and footnote omitted):
Kelman and the Critics cannot easily turn aside the charge that they
seek to impose upon others their own notion of what everyone else's
inner will needs in order to achieve fulfillment. Their open acceptance
of the need for what they call "paternalism" in human affairs does not in
itself make the case against them, but the specific kind of argument they are
compelled to make does.
Genovese does not describe or discuss the "specific kind of argument" to
which he is referring, but rather merely drops a footnote that gives the
page references to Kelman's discussion of paternalism-together with a
gratuitous "and passim"-andadds: "Kelman shows the CLS to be uneasy
about paternalism, and he makes some useful distinctions. But he also
shows that, by any other name, a strong dose of paternalism lies implicit in
CLS thought" (id at 145 n.22). At a later point, Genovese seemingly recognizes the tension between the "open acceptance" of paternalism that he
attributes to cls in his text and the "uneas[iness]" about it that he describes in the accompanying footnote, but he attributes this conflict to cls
and the Guide rather than to his own assumptions (id at 146):
Kelman and the Critics abhor dependency relations and people who
give orders. Their defense of "paternalism" would seem to imply the
one and countenance the other, but they make no effort to square the
circle. Their argument, as Kelman presents it, comes close to an assertion that dependency is not really dependency when it realizes the
dependent's inner will.
Indeed, Genovese anticipates Kelman's likely response to these claims,
but-once again directing the reader to the Guide's discussion of paternalism-he abruptly dismisses them: "Kelman might well deny that CLS invokes the doctrine of inner will.., but I see no other way to read him and
the Critics generally" (id. at 145 n.21).
Of course, there is another way to read the Guide, but Genovese
missed it in much the same manner and for much the same reason that
Massey did. Thus, the "specific kind of argument" that Kelman presents
in the passage Genovese cites (at 137-41) was an effort to demonstrate
that "a strong dose of paternalism lies implicit"-not, as Genovese would
have it, "in CLS thought" (GR at 145 n.22)-but within liberal legalism
itself. And far from suggesting the "open acceptance" of such arguments
by critical scholars that Genovese claims, the passage in question made
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clear that most critical scholars find arguments of this sort deeply problematic and troubling (at 138). How did Genovese arrive at such a misconstruction? In a sense, he was already there. Throughout his review, he
makes the same assumptions Massey, Barnes, and Farber did: that what is
at stake is, in Genovese's words, "the principle to be privileged" (GR at
137) and that critical scholars, again in his words, "would like to reverse
matters and privilege [liberalism's] counter-principle[s]" (id.). Thus, if Kelman presents a sustained and trenchant critique of intentionalism, then,
reasons Genovese, he must be in favor of "revers[ing] matters" and
privileging paternalism (id. at 145 & n.22). Similarly, if Kelman presents
an "often cogent critique of the privileging of rules over standards" (id. at
134), then, reasons Genovese, he must be in favor of "revers[ing] matters"
and privileging standards (id. at 134-35).70 And if Kelman criticizes the
traditional focus of liberal scholars on the democratization of the so-called
public realms of social life-and their corresponding tendency to ignore
the "daily experiences of thorough disempowerment" at the hands of, say,
husbands, "who are in the liberal imagination's private sphere" (at 198-99,
emphasis in original)-then, reasons Genovese, he must once again be in
favor of "revers[ing] matters" and favor "the privileging of the claims of
the state" over those of "the privacy of the family" (GR at 147).
The last of Genovese's points suggests just how profoundly Genovese
and others like him have misunderstood Kelman's critique of privileging.
Consider Genovese's argument in full context (id., emphasis added):
Much of family life may be put beyond the purview of the state without giving a blank check to wife-beaters and child abusers. The privacy of the family has long been respected while limited. But that
arrangement requires the recognition of a legitimate authority in both
state and family and an acceptance of such dreaded hierarchy as that
of parents over children....

The problem concerns the bias brought to bear on the large and unavoidably gray area between the claims of privacy and the necessity for intervention to curb atrocities. On that question, the burden of the Critics'
70. There is in fact some ambiguity concerning Genovese's view of Kelman's position-and the position of cls generally-on the issue of rules and standards. Thus, at one
point, Genovese states that "[i]t is not clear to me that Kelman in fact does think [rules]
should be dispensed with" (id.at 134). But a few paragraphs later, Genovese approvingly
quotes Harold Berman's measured response to the cls criticisms of rules (i. at 134-35):
"Berman properly scoffs at the notion that the replacement of the emphasis on rules by one
on substance would end well, especially if carried as far as many of the Critics seem willing to
go. 'What is to prevent discretionary justice,' he asks, 'from being an instrument of repression and even a pretext for barbarism and brutality, as it became in Nazi Germany?' " One
is tempted to answer Professor Berman's question thus: The same thing that will prevent
the current Supreme Court's rule-obsessed jurisprudence from serving as "an instrument of
repression and even a pretext for barbarism and brutality"-a differently constituted
Supreme Court and a different social/legal/cultural context. See Steven L. Winter, "Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law," 78 CaL L Rev. 1441 (1990).
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argument points toward the privileging of the claims of the state. I should
suggest that even those of us who place community cohesion above
individual right would do well to resist that siren call, lest we undermine the measure of individual freedom that ought to be compatible
with social safety.
There is something important missing in Genovese's formulation of the
"problem" at issue as a straightforward conflict between "the claims of
privacy" and "the claims of the state": the claims of women who experience-within and without the family-a "dreaded hierachy" that Genovese doesn't seem to notice. As Catharine MacKinnon has argued: "The
law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom.
For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate
violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of
private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination." 71 Thus,
the argument is not-as Genovese would have it-that liberalism errs by
privileging "[tihe privacy of the family" and that the error can be cured by
simply "privileging... the claims of the state" (GR at 147). Indeed, in the
very passage to which Genovese evidently refers, Kelman goes out of his
way to warn that "there are real limitations to focusing political energy on
the state" in attempting to deal with the pervasive problem of sexual violence (at 199 & n.35). 72 The argument is rather that viewing the matter
through the traditional liberal lens of privileged private realms versus massive state incursions-Bambi meets Godzilla, over and over and over
again--obscures a vital point about the experience of some rather dreadful
73
features of our social life.

71. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 168 (cited in note 23).
72. The "state" is not, after all, some gender-neutral abstraction. As Mason Williams
put it in the somewhat different context of the riots that accompanied the 1968 Chicago
Democratic convention, "I'd call the police, but they're already here." See generally MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 157-70.
73. Genovese's nigh complete erasure of the victim here is of a piece with his snide
remarks concerning Kelman's frequent use of the female personal pronoun when the antecedent is not gender-specific (GR at 136-37):
I make no apology to the ladies for usually writing "men" instead of "persons" and
always writing "his" instead of "his/her" or God knows what, for I cannot fathom how
a commitment to justice and equity for women requires a trashing of the great English
language.... What have we come to when men who aspire to speak seriously of serious
things degrade themselves by cowering before threatened accusations of sexism?
From which I suppose we are to gather (I) that persons other than "ladies" (gentlemen?)
shouldn't be offended by sexist language; (2) that "men" (but not women?) who endeavor to
avoid sexist language are intellectual cowards; (3) that the notion that linguistic conventions
reflect and reinforce the ways that we think-and indeed are the way that we think-is too
arcane to "fathom" (and accordingly that law has a hegemonic function but language does
not?); and (4) that to speak harshly of sexism and "to speak seriously of serious things" are
mutually exclusive categories.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

If I am right about all of this, then the hostile reaction of many mainstream academics to the work of critical scholars is rich with irony:
Whatever the possibilities may be in the current legal culture for the development of insights with genuine transformative potential, the What would
you put in its place? obsession may render all of us considerably less likely to
grasp, let alone to generate, them. As Kelman observes (at 290), liberal
legalism's privileged positions reinforce a "utopian imagery of ordinary
life" through the reproduction and maintenance of "a discourse in which
we are repeatedly allowed to imagine a lovely world of self-determined subjects, expressing consistent, unambivalent, and unexceptionable desires,
seeking their ends in a private world of voluntary transactions freed from
force or nonnatural necessity by a state that imposes only clear rules
against illicit force." When Kelman attempts to move that discourse to
center stage and to call its continuing utility into question-to explore and
expose "the gaps between the utopian fantasy and a shared, lived, complex
reality" (id.)-he is taken to task for failing to offer a utopian fantasy of his
own. Indeed, his critics posit one for him-assembled handily from liberal
legalism's ready stock of counter-imagery-and then condemn him both
for harboring Stalinist impulses and for denying that he does so. What
would you put in its place? thinking thus operates as a highly effective inoculation against the twin viruses of self-consciousness and critique.
Make no mistake about the limits of my argument: I do not for a
moment mean to minimize the contribution of willfulness and calculation
in many of the past decade's just plain wrong-on-the-facts denunciations of
scholars associated with cls. 74 I suspect, to take a not quite random example, that the editors of the Wall Street Journal who have displayed such a
keen interest in the cls debate can, contrary to the available evidence, tell
the difference between a Jaguar and a Nissan Sentra, even when they are
reporting on Duncan Kennedy's driving habits. 75 Indeed, Kennedy was
74. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, "McCarthyism and Critical Legal Studies," 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L
L Rev. 665 (1987) (book review). My own sense is that intergenerational jealousies, misunderstandings, and institutional power struggles account for even more of the hostile treatment of critical scholars than does the Red scare; Kelman offers a brief but insightful
analysis along these latter lines (at 298-99 n.12).
75. I refer here to the op-ed piece run by the Journal in 1990 by Brian Timmons, then a
second-year student at Harvard. See Wall SL J., 3 Apr. 1990, at S A, p. 20. Timmons made
a series of standard-issue anti-left charges against Kennedy-and leftist academics generally-that were intended to suggest that we all live lives of unremitting hypocrisy. Thus, he
argued that we zealously support egalitarianism in every aspect of American life except with
respect to the running of the elite educational institutions that give us our daily bread and
that we broadly embrace the cause of working people in our scholarly work but shun them
and ignore their interests in our personal lives. Drawing on a rhetorical move that has
worked well for recent presidents and Supreme Court nominees alike-i.e., summon up a
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surely right when he argued several years ago that some cls detractors have
deliberately engaged in what he called "the politics of mischaracterization." 76 But mischaracterization is as often the result of unexamined assumptions as it is of conscious manipulation, and the attacks on and
misreadings of cls have sprung forth from too many quarters where good
faith and good sense are otherwise the norm for me to be comfortable with
only the latter story.
The point of this essay, then, is that What would you put in its place?
thinking-together with the classic liberal division of the realm of the possible into dichotomous choices-has lead many critics of cls to conclude
that the relentless exposure of liberalism's contradictions and the vigorous
critique of its privileged positions is the product of covert political commitments. It is these assumptions that lead the critics, perhaps quite unconsciously, to project onto critical scholarship the very structures of thought
that we are trying to understand and to rethink. And it is these assumptions that induce them to label us as the ones with the authoritarian impulse-and permit them to do so without the slightest trace of irony.

home-spun, folksy image just before you lie-Timmons invoked the populist wisdom of his
working-class grandfather, with whom Timmons had reportedly discussed Kennedy's infamous proposal for job swapping between law faculty and custodial staff: "Few intellectuals,
according to my grandfather, could ever speak for the common man, because few have ever
lived his life. (Inever told my grandfather about the Jaguar that Duncan Kennedy drives to
school. I didn't have to.)" Id.
Jeremy Paul and I wrote a response pointing out that Timmons's charge was embarrassingly wide of the mark in Kennedy's case, citing among other things Duncan's outspoken
support for aggressive affirmative action (indeed, randomness) in law school hiring and admissions policies, and his active personal involvement with housing and labor issues in the
Harvard and greater Boston communities. Wal St. J., 7 May 1990, at S A, p. 15. Whether
those facts undermined Timmons's broader claim may be a matter of opinion, but the Journal edited out of our letter an additional point that might have called into question both
Timmons's good faith and the Journal's capacity for scrupulous fact checking when
presented with assertions that correspond to its cozy world view: In 1990 Kennedy owned
and drove a 1985 Nissan Sentra, not the Jaguar of Timmons's overactive imagination. The
defensive circle-the-wagons response we later encountered when we asked Journal officials
either to correct the misreported fact or to print the censored portion of our letter revealed
a commitment to "the party line"-on this, seemingly the most trivial of issues-that one
would more readily associate with popular images of small-time dictators than with a
respected organ of the national press; evidently, the perceived need to assure its readers that
radicals drive fancy cars too (and hence can safely be ignored as hypocrites) outweighed the
Journal'sdesire to get the facts straight.
76. The source of the quoted phrase is Kennedy's memorable extemporaneous response to Steven Burton's cls-believes-that-law-is-junk speech at the 1986 AALS annual
meeting. For the published version of Burton's remarks, see "Reaffirming Legal Reasoning:
The Challenge from the Left," 36 J.Legal Educ. 358 (1986).

